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COMBATING CIVILIAN CASUALTIES:
RULES AND BALANCING IN
THE DEVELOPING LAW OF WAR
R. George Wright*
This Article addresses why we need to reconsider the roles of
rules, explicit balancing, and focusing on consequences of key
international law provisions in light of recent developments in
war. In conducting this reconsideration, this Article weighs the
possible tradeoffs between enhancing the progressive content of
the law of war and enhancing compliance with that law. This
reconsideration will also be impacted by differences in motives
for fighting and a group's responsiveness to relevant
international law. This Article concludes that some
circumstances, particularly in the context of the intentional
killing of civilians, require flat, fixed rules, while others require
more sensitive, explicit balancing tests.
I. INTRODUCTION
Of late, it has seemed that the law of war is due for
reassessment.1  A number of developments have placed
unaccustomed strain on familiar principles of the law of war. Some
important elements of just such a reconsideration of the law of war
are considered here. This Article tries to account for some of these
developments insofar as they affect the important subject of
noncombatants in the law of war.
Much has recently been changing in the practice of war. We
have seen the rise of non-governmental fighting forces that do not
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for their comments go to Christine Bosau, Bill Bradford, Kathleen Henderson,
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University-Indianapolis summer research grant.
1. Though it must be said that such reappraisals can be appropriate at
any reasonable interval. See, e.g., J. Bryan Hehir, Just War Theory in a Post-
Cold War World, 20 J. RELIGIOUS ETHICS 237, 238 (1992) (discussing the danger
in "understating how completely we need to rethink war, politics, and ethics
today"); D. Thomas O'Connor, A Reappraisal of the Just-War Tradition, 84
ETHics 167, 168 (1974).
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meet some of the standard indicators of even guerrilla combat
forces.! Differences in traditional military capabilities of opposing
forces have in some recent cases been dramatic.3 As well, religious
dimensions of warfare have ascended into prominence.4 The very
ideas of success in war, of the goals of deterrence versus retribution,
of the probability of success in war, of the boundaries between war
and other forms of conflict, and of the termination of war have
recently come under renewed scrutiny.5
Our attention will be focused primarily on the process of the
fighting of war itself, and in particular on the combatant/non-
combatant distinction. We notice first in this context a new and
increasing capacity for the controlled and discriminate use of some
contemporary weapons systems.' Often, such weapons are used
with some degree of self-imposed risk to the user, for the sake ofreducing unintended civilian casualties.7  But even the best
2. See, for example, the discussion in Aryeh Neier, The Military Tribunals
on Trial, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Feb. 14, 2002, at 11, 11 (discussing the issues of the
wearing of uniforms, open display of arms, and general respect for the customs
and laws of war).
3. See, e.g., Edward Cody, When 'Martyrs' Are Not Yet Men: Palestinians
Fear Rise of Youth Suicide Culture After Troops Kill 3 Boys, WASH. POST, May
10, 2002, at Al (attack by three fifteen-year-old Palestinian boys "with a crude
pipe bomb and some knives" on Israeli soldiers guarding an Israeli settlement).
More generally, see a number of the responses in Michael Marien et al., The
New Age of Terrorism: Futurists Respond, FUTURIST, Jan.-Feb. 2002, at 16.
4. See, e.g., Patricia A. Long, In the Name of God: Religious Terrorism in
the Millennium: An Analysis of Holy Terror, Government Resources, and the
Cooperative Efforts of a Nation to Restrain its Global Impact, 24 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 51 (2000); Marien et al., supra note 3, at 16.
5. See, e.g., Sir Michael Howard, It's Not so Much War It's More Like a
Hunt, TIMES (London), Oct. 2, 2001, available at 2001 WL 4934414 ("'[Tjhe war
against terrorism' cannot be won, for terrorism will always be available as a
weapon in the hands of people desperate and ruthless enough to use it."); Is
This Just War?, U.S. CATH., Dec. 2001, at 12, 14 (In an interview with Lisa
Sowle Cahill and Father Michael Baxter, Cahill remarked, "there has to be
reasonable 'hope of success,' and that's very doubtful in this case as well."). For
a sense of historical continuity of the concept of war, see George P. Fletcher,
The Storrs Lectures: Liberals and Romantics at War: The Problem of Collective
Guilt, 111 YALE L.J. 1499, 1514-15 (2002) ("War always requires coordinated
action, a chain of command, a sense of organization and, above all, a
consciousness on the part of the individuals engaged in military action that
they are acting as part of the collective effort.").
6. See, e.g., Thomas E. Ricks, Bull's-Eye War: Pinpoint Bombing Shifts
Role of GIJoe, WASH. POST, Dec. 2, 2001, at Al.
7. See, for example, the discussion of the NATO decision not to bomb the
Serbian so-called "Rock-n-Roll" bridge, to limit civilian casualties, including the
lives of Serbian volunteers who stood upon the bridge calculatedly in Randy W.
Stone, Comment, Protecting Civilians During Operation Allied Force: The
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technology, coupled with some self-restraint on the part of the
8attacker, certainly does not ensure the safety of noncombatants.
At the same time, we also see some fighting forces intentionally
killing legally protected noncombatants, at the predictable price of
the attackers' own deaths.9 Even some of what are often casually
assumed to be neutral and benign, or even universally beneficial,
conventions of war fighting have been intentionally violated.'°
Other such conventions have been manipulated, in ways that
endanger even the manipulating group's own noncombatants, for
the sake of military advantage, or out of perceived necessity."
These developments have occurred against a historical
background in which noncombatants generally have been bearing an
increasing share of overall casualties and of the harshest burdens of
war. 2 Taken together, these developments should prompt our best
thinking about the international legal control of war. This Article
will address these recent developments in the context of what we
might call the logic of the law of war. In particular, we shall, in
light of the developments referred to above, broadly reconsider the
Enduring Importance of the Proportional Response and NATO's Use of Armed
Force in Kosovo, 50 CATH. U. L. REV. 501, 529-30 (2001). For further reference
to the tactical use and moral status of more or less innocent shields, see Larry
Alexander, A Unified Excuse of Preemptive Self-Protection, 74 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1475, 1482-83 (1999); Justice De Bunker, The Case of the Speluncean
Explorers: Revisited, 112 HARv. L. REV. 1899, 1902-09 (1999). See also infra
notes 34-35 and accompanying text. For the use of unnecessarily
indiscriminate advanced technology, see generally Virgil Wiebe, Footprints of
Death: Cluster Bombs as Indiscriminate Weapons Under International
Humanitarian Law, 22 MICH. J. INT'L L. 85 (2000).
8. See, e.g., Nicholas D. Kristof, Editorial, A Merciful War, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 1, 2002, at A25 ("My best guess is that we killed 8,000 to 12,000 Taliban
fighters, along with about 1,000 Afghan civilians."). This Article will use
"noncombatant" and "civilian" as synonyms, without seeking thereby to bypass
any genuine moral complications.
9. See, e.g., supra note 3 and accompanying text.
10. The intentional targeting of those customarily conceived as civilians
may make sense to a force that seeks to re-designate who counts as a civilian, or
that believes its own civilians to be already in some serious sort of jeopardy, or
that attacks on civilians will raise one's profile or damage enemy morale. See
infra notes 15-16, 171 and accompanying text.
11. See, for example, the practice of calculatedly stationing either friendly
or hostile civilians near military targets in order to discourage attacks, as
discussed supra note 7 and infra notes 34-35.
12. See Harry Dunphy, Civilians Make Up More War Casualties,
ASSOCIATED PRESS ONLINE, May 2, 2002, available at 2002 WL 20248016 ("War
increasingly targets civilians and puts mothers and children at greater risk of
dying or losing their homes.... "); Women and Children Bear Brunt of War,
SAIGON TIMES DAILY, May 3, 2002, available at 2002 WL 3335988 (citing an
increase from five percent noncombatant war casualties to sixty-five percent to
ninety percent over the course of the twentieth century).
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roles of rules, of explicit balancing, and of focusing on consequences
13in key provisions of the international law of war.
In the course of this reconsideration, we must bear in mind
possible tradeoffs between enhancing the progressive content of the
law of war and enhancing compliance with that law.14 We shall
conclude that differences in motives for fighting, 5 and particularly
in a group's responsiveness' 6 to relevant international law, 17
complicate our judgments of the best ways to interpret the law of
war.18 If we recognize the value of uniform applicability of the law
as well as that of contextual sensitivity in the law,' 9 some difficult
tradeoffs will be required.2° Crucially, we shall see that some
circumstances call for a choice between adopting flat, fixed rules, as
opposed to adopting more sensitive, explicit balancing tests in
interpreting key provisions of the law of war." We may gain
educational value and progressivity for the law at a manageable cost
if we apply balancing tests in some cases. This will be especially
true in cases directly affecting groups that are, at least for the
moment, thought to be especially sensitive to considerations of
international law.22  But there may, on the other hand, be
advantages in applying flat rules in the case of other sorts of groups,
and in literally all cases of the intentional targeting of civilians.'
13. See infra Parts III-VI.
14. "Compliance" as used here is meant to include considerations of the
realistic enforceability of the law, beyond voluntary compliance.
15. Compliance with particular international legal norms, no less than withregard to domestic legal norms, presumably may vary depending upon motives
such as pure calculative gains in wealth, protection of established economic
relationships, religious fanaticism, or the desire for a homeland. See infra note
171 and accompanying text.
16. We shall assume that some cultures can even be defined in part by
considerations including, for example, presumed religious fanaticism, or desire
for a homeland, or for trade. See generally BENJAMIN R. BARBER, JIHAD VS.
MCWORLD: How GLOBALISM AND TRIBALISM ARE RESHAPING THE WORLD (1996).
17. See infra notes 25-34 and accompanying text.
18. See infra Part V.
19. Even if it were otherwise optimal to do so, there would be costs and
difficulties in interpreting some crucial rules of war as involving balancing tests
for some groups and flat rules for others. Rules can be drafted at least so as to
provide for facial uniformity while retaining proper sensitivity to national
differences through reference to relevant circumstances, capacities of the
parties, reasonable capacity, and so forth. This is not to suggest that
international and domestic legislation cannot or should not distinguish among
entities based on size, population, and so forth where relevant.
20. See infra notes 87-95 and accompanying text.
21. See infra Parts III-VI.
22. Depending in part on the considerations referred to supra note 15, not
all groups may be considered equally sensitive, at any given time, to any
particular court of world opinion or even to possible rules of actual courts. See
infra note 170 and accompanying text.
23. See infra Parts V-VT.
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We shall see that even the groups thought to be most amenable to
international law should adhere to flat, absolute rules, rather than
attempt direct interest balancing in the special context of the
intentional killing of civilians. 24
II. SOME CRUCIAL PROVISIONS OF THE LAW OF WAR
REGARDING NONCOMBATANTS
Among the most widely discussed elements of the contemporary
international law of war is Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of
1949.' For the sake of convenience and clarity, let us merely list
here a few of the key provisions of Protocol I. Specifically, we will
focus on Article 51,26 Article 57,27 and Article 58.2'
Paragraph 4 of Article 51 prohibits "indiscriminate attacks. 29
Very roughly, indiscriminate attacks include those not aimed at a
specific military target, those using weapons that cannot be aimed
solely at the military target, and those using weapons the effects of
which cannot be confined to the military target.30 But the scope of
prohibited indiscriminate attacks also includes broader failures of
discrimination. For example, prohibited indiscriminate attacks also
24. See infra Part VI.
25. See Diplomatic Conference on Reaffirmation and Development of
International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflict: Protocols I and
II to the Geneva Conventions, June 8, 1977, 16 I.L.M. 1391 (entered into force
Dec. 7, 1978) [hereinafter Protocol I]. Some of the most directly relevant
materials are conveniently collected in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: A
COLLECTION OF CONVENTIONS, RESOLUTIONS, AND OTHER DOCUMENTS (Dietrich
Schindler & Jiri Toman eds., 3d ed. 1988). Internet access to the relevant
provisions is available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html.intlinst.htm (last visited
Feb. 6, 2003). Substantive war crimes provisions generally comparable to those
discussed below are contained in the Elements of Crimes sections of Addendum
Part II to the Report of the Preparatory Commission for the International
Criminal Court, which went into effect July 1, 2002, without the United States'
ratification. See, e.g., United Nations, Report of the Prepatory Commission for
the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2, art.
8(2)(b)(iv), available at http://www.un.org/law/icc (last modified Dec. 3, 2002)
(referring to the proportionality requirement, by that term, at explanatory note
36, and providing some further attempted clarification, while narrowing the
proscription in some respects).
26. Protocol I, supra note 25, art. 51.
27. Id. art. 57.
28. Id. art. 58. For a discussion of the official United States position
regarding the status of Protocol I, see generally Michael J. Matheson, Session
One: The United States Position on the Relation of Customary International Law
to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 2 AM. U. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 419 (1987).
29. Protocol I, supra note 25, art. 51(4).
30. Id.
2003]
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
include those which may be expected to cause incidental loss of
civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a
combination thereof which would be excessive in relation to the
concrete and direct military advantages anticipated.3'
This provision establishes that unintended and even
subjectively unforeseen and sincerely regretted civilian deaths may
be prohibited.32 Not all unintended civilian harms are prohibited,
though. Only those unintended civilian deaths and other harms are
barred that are either unnecessary or somehow override or outweigh
"the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated"' from the
attack, however, the idea of an "attack" is understood.
Paragraph 7 of Article 51 recognizes the incentives created by
the above provisions, and prohibits using civilians as human shields
for the purpose of protecting legitimate military targets from
attack."' The manipulative use by a defender of civilians as human
shields at an otherwise legitimate military target does not, however,
relieve the attacker of its obligations toward civilian
noncombatants. 5
Developing some of these general themes, Article 57 requires an
attacker to "take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and
methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event to
minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and
damage to civilian objects."'6
Further, a prospective attacker must "refrain from deciding to
launch any attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of
civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a
combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated."37
Finally, and closely related, Article 57 adds that:
[A]n attack shall be cancelled or suspended if it becomes
apparent that the objective is not a military one or is subject to
special protection or that the attack may be expected to cause
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to
31. Id. art. 51(5)(b).
32. See id.
33. Id. Query, though, whether "concrete and direct" requires immediacy
in either time or space. This is further complicated by characterizing an attack
as merely part of a broader (simultaneous) attack.
34. Id. art. 51(7); see also id. art. 58(b) (providing that parties "shall, to the
maximum extent feasible.., avoid locating military objectives within or near
densely populated areas").
35. See the discussion in W. Hays Parks, Air War and the Law of War, 32
A.F. L. REV. 1, 160-68 (1990).
36. Protocol I, supra note 25, art. 57(2)(a)(ii).
37. Id. art. 57(2)(a)(iii).
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civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military
advantage anticipated."B
There is much that might be said about these provisions
generally, and about problems and possibilities in their
interpretation. Interestingly, some of the provisions above seem, at
least initially, to lend themselves most obviously to interpretation as
calling for some sort of weighing and balancing process. But there
also seems, on the other hand, to be a flat rule that would simply
prohibit an attack intentionally directed solely at civilians, even for
purposes such as intimidation or reducing civilian morale. 9
In the latter such case, we say that the provision takes the form
of a flat rule rather than a balancing test because the language
chosen seems calculated to discourage balancing of harms and
benefits in any explicit way, at least at the level of the rule itself.
That is, the latter rule seems to preclude a claim that the
intentional killing of civilians might be balanced somehow against
resulting benefits such as winning a future battle, or even
shortening or de-escalating a war. These sorts of possible
justifications for intentional direct attacks against civilians seem to
be ruled out, whatever moral weight one might wish to grant them.
Such an interpretation of the latter provision seems at least
plausible.
Some of the other provisions cited above, however, do seem
more literally accommodating of some sort of guided weighing and
balancing process.4" On such an interpretation, for example, we
could conclude that some unintended civilian casualties violate the
laws of war, but that others do not, depending in part on the value41
of the "concrete and direct42 military advantage"" thought" to be
38. Id. art. 57(2)(b).
39. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text. In addition, Article 48
specifies that attackers "shall direct their operations only against military
objectives." Protocol I, supra note 25, art. 48; see also id. art. 51(2) ("The
civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the
object of attack. Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to
spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited."). Classically, see 3
HuGo GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE, ch. 11, § 9-10 (A.C. Campbell
trans. 1901); Francisco de Vitoria, On the Law of War, in POLITICAL WRITINGS:
FRANCISCO DE VITORIA 293, 314-15 (Anthony Pagden & Jeremy Lawrance eds.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1539).
40. See supra notes 31, 36-38 and accompanying text.
41. Contemporaneous assessments of military "value" by interested parties
would seem, for various reasons, often readily contestable.
42. The focus on "concrete and direct" military value appears to be an
attempt to limit the sheer speculativeness, open-endedness, and subjectivity of
this inquiry. Why "indirect" but certain consequences should be ignored is
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obtainable thereby.'
Some type of weighing and balancing process thus seems
invited by these and similar provisions. It would thus be natural to
interpret such provisions as balancing-oriented rather than rule-
oriented. Actually, though, it is possible to argue for a rule-oriented
approach to even these provisions. There are grounds for taking the
above references to "excessiveness"" to invoke the ideas of
proportionality and proportionalism. 47 And there is actually room
for debate, we shall see,4' as to whether proportionalism is in turn
best interpreted as a balancing-oriented idea or as a rule-oriented
idea.
The first task, though, is to convey some idea of the fiendish
difficulties of interpretation, reasonable application, and legal
enforcement of the above provisions addressing incidental injuries to
noncombatants, specifically when they are interpreted to invite
weighing and balancing. For this purpose we will draw not only
upon the provisions' facial difficulties, but as well on a few of the
quandaries raised by recent American military efforts in
Afghanistan. 49 Some of the limitations of balancing tests in the law
of war can be recognized through mere reflection, but others present
themselves most vividly only in the complexity of lived experience.
We will then briefly note the advantages in some law of war
contexts of some flat rules over even the most subtle balancing tests,
while still appreciating the value of balancing tests in other
contexts, at least as applied to certain sorts of combatant forces. At
the end of the day, we will want that combination of rules and
balancing tests, appropriately applied to the appropriate parties,
that offers us the best combination of progressive content and
otherwise mysterious.
43. See supra text accompanying notes 31, 36-38.
44. The texts refer to a limited class of military advantage that is, simply,"anticipated" by the attacker. See supra text accompanying notes 31, 36-38.
Whether all anticipated advantages can also be more objectively said to be
realistically anticipated, especially given the informational inadequacies and
emotional pulls of battle decision-making, is of course doubtful.
45. But presumably not otherwise as readily obtainable, or perhaps
realistically obtainable at all. For some vague guidance in the matter of
selecting among options, see, for example, Article 57(2)(a)(ii), which states that
incidental civilian casualties are to be avoided, or at least minimized, through
all "feasible" precautions. Protocol I, supra note 25, art. 57(2)(a)(ii). In some
ways, this sort of guidance tends to complicate, rather than clarify, matters for
decision-makers. See also the complications raised supra note 33.
46. See supra text accompanying notes 31, 37-38.
47. See Parks, supra note 35, at 170-75.
48. See infra Part V.
49. See infra notes 59-80 and accompanying text.
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realistic enforceability of the law of war, while recognizing the value
of at least some uniformity of application of the law of war.
III. LEGAL BALANCING TESTS IN THE FOG OF WAR:
INDETERMINACIES IN AVOIDING UNJUSTIFIABLE CIVILIAN CASUALTIES
For the sake of simplicity, let us say that no attack may be
undertaken or continued if the incidental harm to noncombatants
may be expected to be excessive or disproportionate. For this
purpose, civilian deaths, civilian injuries, and damage to civilian
objects count as the relevant costs. 0 On the other side of the
metaphorical balance stands "the concrete and direct military
advantage anticipated."5' Of course, the military value of an attack
cannot justify incidental civilian casualties that are unnecessary in
that the same or an equal military advantage could have been
gained by means involving fewer anticipated but incidental civilian
casualties.5 2
Without rising from our armchairs, we can see some of the
disturbing indeterminacies involved in this sort of balancing.
Suppose, for example, an opponent's war council meets in the
evenings in the otherwise deserted leading art museum, in a room
full of invaluable paintings. The war council also meets during the
daytime at a secluded restaurant, attended by civilian and non-
civilian restaurant staff. Can we say without doing some additional
moral thinking which attack is better under the relevant law of war?
The law seeks to reduce indeterminacy by disregarding any
military advantage that is not "concrete and direct."53 Reducing
indeterminacy in the law is doubtless usually a good thing. But
here, reduced indeterminacy requires some price in realism, and in
the credibility of the law. Military operations, like moves in chess,
are sometimes sensibly undertaken with an eye toward indirect,
long-term payoffs, whether such payoffs are certain or not. 5 4 We
50. Id. Who counts as a civilian, and what sorts of infrastructural elements
count as civilian objects, of course raise traditional problems. For some specific
complications, see infra text accompanying notes 158-59.
51. See supra text accompanying notes 37-38.
52. See in particular Protocol I, supra note 25, arts. 57(1), 57(3).
53. See supra text accompanying notes 37-38, as well as further
complicating questions referred to supra note 33 and infra text accompanying
note 56.
54. Consider as one possible example the largely morale-oriented Halsey-
Doolittle April 1942 air raid over Tokyo and other cities, in which both
demolition and incendiary bombs were intended to be dropped on Japanese
industrial centers. Our point here is not to ask about the disproportionality of
the civilian casualties and damage or to ask whether some civilian casualties in
such a case should have been classified as intended rather than as merely
2003]
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
could, presumably, simply classify home-front morale-boosting raids
as conferring a concrete and direct military advantage. But then,
what sorts of worthwhile military goals could not be classified as
concrete and direct? Much of the supposed value of focusing on the
concrete and the direct would then be lost.
The law must then adopt one standpoint or another in
determining how many incidental civilian casualties could have
been expected at the relevant times. Those who best know the
overall strategic military plan may not best know the relevant
capacities and limitations in a specific context of the weapons in
question, and yet a third group may best know the current
conditions on the ground, the presence and disposition of actual
civilians, etc.55 Even if all the relevant decision-makers can timely
coordinate, the decision-makers' perceptions will of course be
distorted by their loyalties, biases, and preconceptions, often under
trying emotional circumstances and severe time pressure. How
much allowance, if any, should the law of war make in this context
for both avoidable and unavoidable human frailty?
Suppose a military decision-maker is charged with inflicting
excessive or disproportionate incidental civilian casualties. Could
the decision-maker defend by claiming that while the casualties may
seem excessive in the narrow context of the discrete military battle
itself, the casualties were not excessive in the broader context of the
successful military campaign of which the narrower battle was a key
element? Is this broader military success sufficiently direct? What
if there were in fact correspondingly few inadvertent civilian
casualties elsewhere during the campaign? Questions of the proper
level of the breadth of examination thus add further
indeterminacy.5
Even more difficult is the broad range of cases in which some
additional degree of civilian safety can be purchased at some further
personal risk exposure on the part of some number of combatants.
incidental. Instead, we emphasize merely that the major point of the raid really
could not be considered to be a concrete and direct military advantage, as
opposed to morale-building. For an authoritative explication, see B25B Special
Project Memo, http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/rep/Doolittle/B25B-
Special.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2003) (contemporaneous memorandum
specifying that "[an action of this kind is most desirable now due to the
psychological effect on the American public, our allies and our enemies").
55. Parks, supra note 35, at 175-77.
56. Id. at 176-77. For elaboration of level of generality problems in other
contexts, see generally J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Symposium,
Constitutional Grammar, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1771 (1994); Mark V. Tushnet, Anti-
Formalism in Recent Constitutional Theory, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1502 (1985). See
also Parks, supra note 35; supra text accompanying note 53.
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Let us suppose that the higher the altitude at which bombing
occurs, the greater the inaccuracy, and the greater the number of
inadvertent civilian casualties. We shall set aside questions of
responsibility for civilian deaths from the defender's own electronic
countermeasures and anti-aircraft fire. Generally, the higher
altitude the bombing, the fewer the attacker's (and perhaps the
defender's) military casualties. Once one has guessed at all of the
available tradeoff options, which strategies, if any, are reasonably
pilot-protective and militarily effective while at the same time not
leading to disproportionate civilian casualties5 7 Note that even
civilians generally may have some stake in pilot safety. Even
civilians may not want to unduly increase risks to military pilots, at
some incidental cost to themselves as civilians, lest morally worthy
and popular humanitarian military interventions not be
undertaken, or lest ground combat become more prominent.
The Protocol I texts do not explicitly acknowledge any of the
above difficulties, nor do they explicitly adopt either strict liability, a"grossly excessive" standard, or a subjective and reasonable good
faith standard. Perhaps there is intended a vaguely aspirational"
quality to the rules-a hope that such open-textured rules can be
progressively interpreted more demandingly over time.
We can gain a better and more concrete sense of some of the
inherent problems in the Protocol I texts addressing incidental
civilian casualties by referring to the American military experience
in Afghanistan. In this conflict, American military officers and legal
staff routinely attempted to assess the risks of the contemplated
particular action to noncombatants in advance.59 Such assessments
could, in many cases, be based partly on information gathered in
remarkable ways. Remotely piloted armed spy planes were often
capable of providing Pentagon officials clear images of small objects
with only a 1.5 second time delay.6°
57. Consider generally the almost continuous choice between higher and
lower altitude bombing, or between daylight and night time bombing in World
War II, as well as the complications caused by inadvertent civilian deaths
directly via defender anti-aircraft fire. See Parks, supra note 35, at 177-78. For
a discussion of the moral justifiability of some forcible interventions, see R.
George Wright, A Contemporary Theory of Humanitarian Intervention, 4 FLA. J.
INT'L L. 435, 435 (1989).
58. Cf Robin West, The Aspirational Constitution, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 241,
262 (1993) (discussing an aspirational reading of the U.S. Constitution).
59. John H. Cushman, Jr., Ideas & Trends; War's Hidden Cost, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 9, 2001, at http://query.nytimes.com/search/article-page.html?res=
9506EODA113CF93AA35751C1A9679C8B63.
60. Michael Evans, Spy-Plane TV Offers Instant Missile Targets, TIMES
(London), Jan. 23, 2002, at 15, available at 2002 WL 4175864. For a discussion
of some operational problems and limitations of the Predator spy plane, see
20031 139
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More generally, a range of different technologies unavailable
even as of the Persian Gulf War have contributed to the increasing
technical ability to discriminate between military targets and
civilians and to reduce unintended casualties among the latter. 1
Many more weapons systems are in this sense "smart.6 2 They can
be much better coordinated than formerly,u and their cost has
generally come down significantly.r Local Afghan spotters on the
ground also contributed information of varying quality,6 which
could potentially be acted upon quickly.6
But even with multiple spotters and confirmation
requirements,67 mistakes of various sorts and magnitudes occur. Let
us first appreciate that the military resistance in Afghanistan
apparently did not include skilled cyber-warriors, electronic
jamming (which may or may not reduce civilian casualties), or even
a credible air force.r These circumstances may not always exist.
But even under these in some respects simplified circumstances, a
number of inescapable indeterminacies plagued American military
judgments of discrimination and proportionality.
In the Afghan conflict, for example, noncombatants intermixed
with combatants in ways ranging from innocent and ordinary to
manipulative and strategic.69 One fleeing Afghan civilian told an
Associated Press reporter that bombs intended for a tunnel complex
had instead hit a village two miles from the complex, destroying
most of the thirty-five village homes, killing fifteen civilians, and
injuring others.7° Such tragic errors were hardly isolated. One
Thom Shanker & James Risen, A Nation Challenged: Raid's Aftermath; U.S.
Troops Search for Clues to Victims of Missile Strike, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2002,
at A12, available at LEXIS, Nexis Library, N.Y. Times File (explaining that
performance suffered at night and in bad weather, that the Predator
experienced excessive breakdowns, and that sometimes the time of availability
of targets was insufficient).
61. See Ricks, supra note 6, at Al.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See Karl Vick, Afghan Spotters Vital to Pinpointing Enemy; Civilians
Led Planes to Targets, WASH. POST, Jan. 13, 2002, at Al, available at 2002 WL
2520837.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See Ricks, supra note 6, at Al.
69. See Dana Priest, In War, Mud Huts and Hard Calls; As U.S. Teams
Guided Pilots' Attacks, Civilian Presence Made Task Tougher, WASH. POST, Feb.
20, 2002, at Al, available at 2002 WL 13818959.
70. Associated Press, U.S. Planes Bomb Suspected Hide-Outs, Jan. 14,
2002, available at http://propl.org/nucnews/2002nn/0201nn/020114nn.htm.
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correspondent wrote that, "[i]n a succession of villages, precision-
guidance munitions from U.S. aircraft sometimes hit precisely the
wrong targets as pilots and their allies on the ground tried to
distinguish between fleeing or hiding targets and vulnerable,
exposed civilians."'" The "air war... left a string of mistakes across
southern Afghanistan."7
These unintended civilian casualties had various causes and
were of various sorts. Some apparently involved a failure, unique or
recurring, in some aspect of the weapons systems involved,73 while
others apparently involved intelligence errors in the identification of
targets.74 In at least one incident, intentionally false local
intelligence reports, allegedly based upon local rivalries and score-
settling, may have contributed to the mis-targeting of Afghan forces
fighting against the Taliban.75 These mistakes could involve a range
of decision-maker states of mind.
Estimates of the total number of civilian casualties in the
Afghan conflict, generally or directly attributable to discrete
American military actions, vary widely and are difficult to verify,
71. Susan B. Glasser, Afghans Live and Die with U.S. Mistakes; Villagers
Tell of Over 100 Casualties, WASH. POST, Feb. 20, 2002, at Al, available at 2002
WL 13818914.
72. Id.; see also Molly Moore, Fleeing U.S. Bombs, Villagers Found No Place
to Hide; Missiles Killed 21 in Two Families, Survivors Say, WASH. POST, Feb.
13, 2002, at Al, available at 2002 WL 13817079 (discussing alleged thirty-
minute period during the night of October 21, 2001, in which missiles
accurately hit precisely intended targets, but where those targets turned out to
harbor two families including seventeen children, rather than Taliban or Al
Qaeda personnel); Doug Struck, Men Hit in U.S. Missile Strike Were
Scavengers; Relatives Say Afghans Were at Al Qaeda Site For Scrap Metal to
Sell, WASH. POST, Feb. 12, 2002, at A13, available at 2002 WL 13816974
(discussing alleged incident of February 4, 2002 in which an accurately aimed
missile strike killed three adults looking for marketable scrap metal at the site
of a previously bombed Al Qaeda camp).
73. See, e.g., Barry Bearak, A Nation Challenged: Casualties; Uncertain
Toll in the Fog of War: Civilian Deaths in Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10,
2002, at Al, available at LEXIS, Nexis Library, N.Y. Times File. A somewhat
similar problem involves cluster bombs that fail to detonate on contact, in effect
becoming land mines, and dangerous over time to civilians. Id.
74. See the two sets of circumstances briefly described supra note 72. See
also the several alleged incidents reported by Barry Bearak supra note 73, at
Al.
75. Carlotta Gall & Craig S. Smith, A Nation Challenged: Raids Revisited;
Afghan Witnesses Say G.I.'s Were Duped in Raid on Allies, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27,
2002, at Al, available at LEXIS, Nexis Library, N.Y. Times File; Thom
Shanker, U.S. Says 16 Killed in Raids Weren't Taliban orAl Qaeda, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 22, 2002, at Al, available at LEXIS, Nexis Library, N.Y. Times File;
Michael Ware, How the U.S. Killed the Wrong Soldiers, TIME, Feb. 11, 2002, at
8, 8, available at 2002 WL 8385696.
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with the biases of the estimator occasionally filling gaps in the
available evidence.76 While some further reductions in civilian
casualties may require only further technological advances, sounder
engineering or production, or redesigns,77 others may require
revisions in strategy or greater self-restraint in war-fighting.78
Consider the tradeoffs between the desire for multiple and
independent confirmations of a military target, and the freshness
and currency of the information by the time the information is
collated and analyzed. 79
More broadly, it may be tempting, especially for an interested
party, to argue that in some cases resolving close calls in favor of
attack, rather than restraint, may increase inadvertent civilian
casualties but also shorten the war and thereby reduce the overall
civilian casualty toll. It may not be obvious even to the civilians
why it is right to care scrupulously about avoiding particular
civilian casualties if this may mean delaying a presumed military
victory that would save a far greater number of civilians.80 The
early routing of a presumed brutal, incompetent, or generally inept
regime may itself save many civilians. We shall address related
problems below.81
IV. THE VALUE AND LIMITATIONS OF BALANCING TESTS
IN THE LAW OF WAR
The law of war requires that incidental civilian casualties not be
excessive or disproportionate to "the concrete and direct military
advantage anticipated 8 2 from the operations inflicting these
casualties. One natural interpretation of this language of excess
and disproportion is as some sort of balancing test. As such, this
76. See, e.g., Bearak, supra note 73, at Al.
77. Presumably it is possible to design any munition to disarm or de-
activate itself, or be disarmed by remote command, if it fails to detonate on
impact. For background, see Major Thomas J. Herthel, On the Chopping Block:
Cluster Munitions and the Law of War, 51 A.F. L. REV. 229, 247-53 (2001).
78. The process of verifying and approving of targets can presumably be
made more or less stringent. See Thomas E. Ricks, Un-Central Command
Criticized: Marine Corps Report Calls Fla. Headquarters Too Far From Action,
WASH. POST, June 3, 2002, at Al (discussing alleged lost opportunities to attack
opposing military positions due to prolonged or careful target verification and
clearance processes).
79. A real-time video image brings the value of currency of information, but
different sources may have different interpretations of what the video image
depicts.
80. For reference to the alleged lost military opportunity dimension, see
Ricks, supra note 78, at Al.
81. See infra Part VI.
82. See supra notes 33, 37-38 and accompanying text.
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provision may share some of the advantages and disadvantages of
weighing and balancing in decision-making generally, as well as its
own contextual advantages and disadvantages.
We should not assume that it is not possible to reasonably
weigh risks of incidental civilian casualties against some sort of
military advantage merely because the two considerations are not
commensurable, or measured in mutually translatable units.
Problems of commensurability may be real and even typical without
being fatal or universal. We should not rule out the possibility of
the necessary comparisons between risks to civilians and military
advantages with undue haste. Rigorously demonstrative certainty
may be unattainable. But sometimes, one value may outweigh
another on any reasonable calculus that reflects the relevant basic
human interests and purposes at stake.
Consider a few examples. Sports performance comparisons are
often notoriously difficult and controversial. But let us suppose
merely that someone claims that "Henry Aaron was a better hitter
in baseball than Eddie 'The Eagle' Edwards was an Olympic ski
jumper." 3 Can we really say no more than that this is a contestable,
subjective evaluative judgment across different sports and times, on
which reasonable minds may differ? If someone sincerely took this
latter, skeptical position we would be unlikely to give up, or to
reassess the merits of the Aaron versus Edwards debate. More
likely, we would conclude that such a person either did not
understand something about sports, or had lost track of what sorts
of judgments this comparison does and does not require.
Let us consider a different example. Can we reasonably
compare the length of lines and the weight of rocks?' In some cases,
we can. A line can be shorter, reasonably, than a rock is heavy. A
one Angstrom unit length line is shorter than a rock-formation
asteroid due to catastrophically collide with the earth is heavy, for
any significant purpose linked to human interests and projects, and
thus non-arbitrarily. Or if we doubt this, consider an admittedly
extreme hypothetical case in the law of war. Let us put some
83. Eddie "The Eagle" Edwards competed with a conspicuous lack of
success at the Calgary Winter Olympics in 1988. See, e.g., Dave Kindred, Only
at the Winter Games, SPORTING NEWS, Feb. 11, 2002, at 60, 60.
84. As addressed in Symposium, When Is a Line as Long as a Rock is
Heavy?: Reconciling Public Values and Individual Rights in Constitutional
Adjudication, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 708 (1994). The assumption that much of the
difficulty in comparing incidental civilian casualties with direct military
advantage stems from their being "unlike quantities and values" is expressed in
Lieutenant Colonel William J. Fenrick, The Rule of Proportionality and Protocol
I in Conventional Warfare, 98 MIL. L. REv. 91, 94-95, 102 (1982).
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number of incidental civilian fatalities in the metaphoricalu scales
against a military advantage thereby obtainable. Consider, by way
of context, the Falklands/Malvinas War between Great Britain and
Argentina in 1982.8 Can we not say that in such a context, an
additional million incidental civilian fatalities would have been
excessive or disproportionate in relation to a connected military
advantage that tipped the outcome of the war in either direction?
Would this conclusion be appropriately coherent and reasonable?
Would a denial of this conclusion really be equally reasonable?
Would not a million civilian casualties be excessive on any
reasonable comparison? We therefore cannot simply dismiss the
possibility of a balancing 7 interpretation of the legal prohibition on
excessive or disproportionate incidental casualties. We should
instead try to assess the coherence, workability, and limitations of
such an interpretation. We will want to consider the value and
limitations of legal balancing tests generally, as well as in the
context of today's law of proportionality between incidental civilian
casualties and direct military advantage.
To some degree, the values and the limitations of an"excessiveness" test, in which civilian casualties are balanced
against military advantage, parallel those of legal balancing tests in
general. Balancing tests in the law are often thought to share with
legal "standards" and "principles" the virtues of flexibility and
responsiveness to circumstance and context.8 In contrast, flat, fixed
rules in the law are said generally to provide better guidance and
85. See, e.g., JOHN BROOME, WEIGHING GOODS: EQUALITY, UNCERTAINTY AND
TIME 7 (1991) (referring to "the metaphor of weighing").
86. See, e.g., RAPHAEL PERL, THE FALKLAND ISLANDS DISPUTE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS (1983). We of course here take neither side,
just as it would presumably be counterproductive to weight any military
advantage to a "just" antagonist as positive, and a similar advantage to an"unjust" antagonist as negative, so that any civilian casualties inflicted by the
latter are illegal. This kind of assessment really returns us to jus ad bellum
questions. See, e.g., RICHARD J. REGAN, JUST WAR: PRINCIPLES AND CASES 18
(1996).
87. This is not to deny the complications introduced by distinguishing
among different forms of balancing. See generally David L. Faigman,
Madisonian Balancing: A Theory of Constitutional Adjudication, 88 Nw. U. L.
REV. 641 (1994) (discussing Madisonian adjudicative balancing of all implicated
government interests and contrasting Madisonian balancing with definitional
balancing and ad hoc balancing).
88. See also Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Administrative Equity: An Analysis of
Exceptions to Administrative Rules, 1982 DUKE L.J. 277, 278 (1982) ("General
rules cannot account for all possible situations."). See generally Alan K. Chen,
The Ultimate Standard: Qualified Immunity in the Age of Constitutional
Balancing Tests, 81 IOWAL. REV. 261 (1995).
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predictability, at some cost in adaptiveness.8 9
Importantly, though, balancing incidental civilian casualties
against military advantage offers neither the advantages nor the
disadvantages of completely open-ended all-things-considered
balancing.90 The law of war does not engage here in such inclusive,
broad balancing. The law of war thus does not weigh into the
balance anything like, say, the effects of incidental casualties on the
local tourist trade, or the asserted moral righteousness of either
party's reasons in going to war in the first place.9 The law of war's
balancing of incidental civilian casualties against some concrete and
direct military advantage thus is not an invitation to uninhibitedly
consider all directly or indirectly relevant factors.
It is admittedly tempting to allow, say, Nazi Germany no room
for causing incidental civilian casualties, given the obvious negative
overall value of any Nazi military advantage. But there would be
substantial disadvantages in doing so. It would be impossible to
disentangle the narrow incidental civilian casualty inquiry from the
broader, prior issue of the justice of the attacking party's cause in
general. There is legally enough to object to independently with
respect to Nazi aggression, Nazi intentional killings during war, and
so on, without short-circuiting any inquiry into any Nazi violation of
mere proportionality.'
Balancing in the incidental civilian casualty context may prove
to be of modest value, but not primarily for reasons ordinarily cited
in a general critique of legal balancing. Some fear that over time,
balancing tests generally tend to become too safe, too predictable,
89. See Chen, supra note 88, at 261.
90. There is certainly some appeal in aspiring to take all, and not just
some, relevant interests into account when balancing. See T. Alexander
Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 1001
(1987).
91. Of course, the traditional just war criteria have required justice in one's
cause in going to war as well as in the war fighting, including, on some
statements, a proportionality between one's cause for war and the magnitude,
character, and effects of one's military response. For reference to the just war
requirements of proportionality ad bellum as opposed to the narrower
requirement of proportionality as an element of jus in bello, see, for example,
JAMES TURNER JOHNSON, MORALITY & CONTEMPORARY WARFARE 27-28 (1999);
PAUL RAMSEY, THE JUST WAR 189-210 (1968); REGAN, supra note 86, at 63-64
("The decision to wage war will be justified only if the wrong to be prevented or
rectified equals or surpasses the reasonably anticipated human and material
costs of the war.").
92. For a recent re-examination of the Nuremberg Trials in a much broader
and largely American context, see generally PETER H. MAGUIRE, LAW AND WAR:
AN AMERICAN STORY (2000); TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG
TRIALS: A PERSONAL MEMOIR (1992).
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too middle of the road, and eventually "a routine and mindless
process."93 On the other hand, some say that general legal balancing
provides insufficient predictability.94
To the first concern, we may say that unless the future of war
surprisingly provides many actually adjudicated incidental civilian-
casualty-balancing cases, we are unlikely to accumulate enough
precedents to achieve much precedent-based predictability. The
technical aspects of combat and even of military advantage may, in
particular, change sufficiently rapidly as to undermine the relevance
of earlier legal precedents.
More importantly, though, each case of incidental civilian
casualties, and each set of expected direct and concrete military
advantages accruing therefrom, is likely to be unique in significant
respects. The remarkable complexities of battlefield assessments
would be matched by the complexities of re-evaluation at trial. The
battlefield assessments, even under the best of circumstances, would
also be strongly colored by emotion and stress,9 and by imperfect
information and reasoning. In particular, to try to predict even the
direct military advantage to be gained only by exposing a civilian
population to some additional hazard is to risk drowning in
unknown contingencies, unexplored alternatives, and disputable
assessments of the value of the advantages in question.
A final complication is that the attacking commander or
political leader may choose to state the military aim of an attack
only in vague, unverifiable, nearly self-fulfilling, or unempirical
terms-not, for example, to capture this or destroy that, but to some
unspecified degree merely to "degrade" temporarily a local
93. Pierre Schlag, The Aesthetics of American Law, 115 HARv. L. REV. 1047,
1080 (2002); cf Jean Bethke Elshtain, Third Annual Grotius Lecture: Just War
and Humanitarian Intervention, 17 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1, 12 (2001) (referring
to unduly "routinized" calculation and classification of incidental civilian
casualties).
94. Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Nebraska Press Association: An Expansion of
Freedom and Contraction of Theory, 29 STAN. L. REV. 431, 463-64 (1977), cited
in Pierre J. Schlag, An Attack on Categorical Approaches to Freedom of Speech,
30 UCLA L. REV. 671, 675 n.12 (1983).
95. Professor Vincent Blasi warns of the risks of complex balancing tests in
the area of free speech, particularly during times of unusual stress and public
emotion, including war. Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the
First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 450 (1985) [hereinafter Blasi,
Pathological Perspective]; see also Vincent Blasi, The Role of Strategic
Reasoning in Constitutional Interpretation: In Defense of the Pathological
Perspective, 1986 DUKE L.J. 696, 704 (1986). In the military context more
specifically, "in the heat and haste of battle reliable information may be as hard
to get as cool calculation will be hard to undertake." GEOFFREY BEST, WAR AND
LAW SINCE 1945, at 327 (1994).
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opponent's capacity to attack again.
Paradoxically, all these uncertainties add in a real sense to the
predictability of the application and enforcement of the incidental
civilian injury balancing test. Such a provision, interpreted as a
complex balancing test, would likely not be called upon to do much
important post-war adjudicatory work. Consider current religiously
motivated groups, or the admittedly extreme case of a latter-day
Third Reich. Would charges of mere imbalance, of mere
excessiveness, in unintended civilian casualties likely be either
relatively easy to prove, or genuine and important contributions to
the moral weight and gravity of any international legal indictment?
Or would such charges rather be distracting, complex, inherently
secondary occasions for speculation, subjectivity, and potentially
endless debate?
As we will see below, there is actually some room for usefully
invoking the incidental civilian casualty provisions of Protocol I even
as a balancing test.9 But it is difficult to imagine such a balancing
test provision vitally and indispensably serving as a frequently
invoked principle against defeated states or groups in actual
international legal adjudication. We should, however, consider the
possibility of interpreting the prohibition of "excessive" or
disproportionate incidental civilian casualties as something other
than a balancing test. We turn to that task now.
V. RULES VERSUS BALANCING AND THE DEBATE OVER
PROPORTIONALITY
As we have seen, the most obvious way to interpret the law's
prohibition of excessiveness or disproportionateness9 of incidental
civilian casualties is somehow to balance the relevant sort of
military advantage gained thereby. Not all rules of war, however,
seem to call for any direct, explicit balancing. The principle of
combatant-civilian discrimination itself does not in this sense call
for balancing. The basic rule of combatant-civilian discrimination
runs as follows: "In order to ensure respect for and protection of the
civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict
shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and
combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and
96. See infra text accompanying notes 110-13.
97. See L.C. GREEN, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 152
(1993) (linking incidental civilian casualties to the "proportionality rule");
Parks, supra note 35, at 170-71. See generally Olivera Medenica, Protocol I and
Operation Allied Force: Did NATO Abide by Principles of Proportionality?, 23
Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 329, 360-64 (2001) (describing the history of the
proportionality doctrine).
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accordingly shall direct their operations only against military
objectives."'
More specifically, "[t]he civilian population as such, as well as
individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack. Acts or threats
of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among
the civilian population are prohibited."
The most obvious reading of these provisions on intentional
attacks on civilians is as prohibitory rules, within their scope, rather
than as invitations to balance. There is no sense that a force can
intend or aim at the deaths of protected civilians if there appears to
be a sufficient military advantage in doing so." Nor can a force
intend or seek the deaths of civilians even if the ensuing terror
would likely bring victory or shorten the war.01 Under these target
discrimination rules, intentional as opposed to incidental 2 killings
of civilians cannot be legally immunized by sufficiently good
consequences. The discrimination rules in this sense amount to
genuine rules, as opposed to explicit balancing tests.
There is nothing inconsistent in prohibiting intentional killings
of civilians by a flat rule, while subjecting incidental killings of
civilians to a balancing test. But this distinction alerts us to
another possibility. Perhaps we need not read the language of"excessiveness" or proportionality 3 regarding incidental civilian
casualties to call for a balancing test. Perhaps even the language of
proportion and excess can be read to evoke rules, rather than
balancing, if there turns out to be a practical point to doing so.
The general idea of proportionality is familiar to us from
domestic law contexts. Some sort of proportionality requirement is
typically imposed in cases of self-defense" and criminal
98. Protocol I, supra note 25, art. 48.
99. Id. art. 51(2).
100. See supra text accompanying notes 97-98.
101. See supra text accompanying note 98.
102. Some aspects of the moral differences between intending someone's
death, however regretfully, as opposed to merely foreseeing such a death as an
unintended side effect, and not as an end in itself or as a means to a desired
end, have been widely discussed under the rubric of the principle of double
effect. See, e.g., Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., Toward Understanding the Principle of
Double Effect, 90 ETHICS 527, 528-29 (1980); R.G. Frey, Some Aspects to the
Doctrine of Double Effect, 5 CANADIAN J. PHIL. 259, 261-64 (1975); John Makdisi,
Justification in the Killing of an Innocent Person, 38 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 85, 85-87
(1990); Warren S. Quinn, Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine of
Double Effect, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 334, 336 (1989).
103. See, e.g., Parks, supra note 35, at 170-71. For some speculative
discussion of the negotiating history in this context of the two largely
interchangeable terms, see Fenrick, supra note 84, at 105.
104. See, e.g., Cynthia K.Y. Lee, The Act-Belief Distinction in Self-Defense
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sentencing.05 Proportionality in the international law of war has
long been discussed,' 6 admittedly most often in contexts involving
the weighing of consequences.' °7
But the idea of proportionality actually need not be interpreted
Doctrine: A New Dual Requirement Theory of Justification, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L.
REV. 191, 205 (1998) (giving an example of proportionate defensive shooting
response, despite a toy gun's unrecognized harmlessness); Cynthia Kwei Yung
Lee, Race and Self-Defense: Toward a Normative Conception of Reasonableness,
81 MINN. L. REV. 367, 476-78 (1996) (describing objective, beyond merely
subjectively reasonable, grounds for using the defensive force, given defendant's
circumstances); Cathryn Jo Rosen, The Excuse of Self-Defense: Correcting a
Historical Accident on Behalf of Battered Women Who Kill, 36 AM. U. L. REV.
11, 31 nn.120-21, 56 (1986) (comparing emphasis on actual circumstances and
actual subjective fears of battering victim with emphasis on "objective
reasonableness"); see also V.F. Nourse, Self-Defense and Subjectivity, 68 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1235, 1239 (2001) (questioning a discourse of subjectivity and objectivity
in criminal law). For discussion of Thomas Aquinas on proportionality in self-
defense, see Germain Grisez, Against Consequentialism, 23 AM. J. JURIS. 21, 53
(1978).
105. See, e.g., Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 366-68 (1910).
106. See, e.g., Ziyad Motala & David T. ButleRitchie, Self-Defense in
International Law, the United Nations, and the Bosnian Conflict, 57 U. PITT. L.
REV. 1, 10 (1995) (referring as far back as to the work of Hugo Grotius);
Lieutenant Commander Dale Stephens, Rules of Engagement and the Concept
of Unit Self Defense, 45 NAVAL L. REV. 126, 136-37 (1998) (referring to the
broader proportionality requirement between cause for hostilities and the scope
of the military response); Timothy J. Heverin, Case Comment, Legality of the
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons: Environmental and Humanitarian Limits on
Self-Defense, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1277, 1283-85 (1997) (explaining the
proportionality inquiry as requiring consideration of environmental
consequences).
107. See, e.g., ROBERT L. HOLMES, ON WAR AND MORALITY 193-94 (1989)
(comparing good effects to bad effects); Brian V. Johnstone, C.SS.R., The
Meaning of Proportionate Reason in Contemporary Moral Theology, 49 THOMIST
223, 232-33 (1985) (finding proportionalism as involving a measuring or balance
of one or more effects with one or more other effects); David Luban, Just War
and Human Rights, 9 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 160, 176 (1980); John Howard Yoder,
How Many Ways Are There to Think Morally About War?, 11 J.L. & RELIGION
84, 94-96 (1995) (linking proportionality and consequentialism); David
Hollenbach, Responding to the Terrorist Attacks: An Ethical Perspective, AM.,
Oct. 22, 2001, at 23, 23 ("Proportionality means that the harm that occurs in
any use of force must not outweigh the harm already done or that might follow
in the future."). Note that this calculation may not seem morally decisive in
cases in which a military aggressor seizes some territory and can credibly claim
to be uninterested in any further conquest, and can equally credibly promise a
tenacious defense of the seized territory. Merely calculative proportionalism
may allow only non-military responses in such a case. One further general
complication is that we may opt for some sort of flat, absolute rule because, at a
deeper level, we think such a rule best balances the various interests at stake.
Balancing can occur at different levels of analysis.
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in terms of weighing and balancing. Sometimes, the proportionality
requirement is stated in terms sufficiently general to encompass
more possibilities than just weighing and balancing. There is useful
breadth, for example, in the following formulation: "When
confronting choices among specific military options, the question
asked by proportionality is: Once we take into account not only the
military advantages that will be achieved by using the means, but
also all the harms reasonably expected to follow from using it, can
its use still be justified?"lce
Such a formulation still refers to "harms," but could encompass
any sort of legal justification, and not necessarily justifications
involving mere calculation, weighing, or balancing." Not all legal
justifications involve balancing. We might well hope for something
beyond a balancing interpretation of proportionality in war, simply
because the balancing interpretation seems especially difficult to
apply, at the time of the military decision, or later judicially.
Certainly, there are many areas of the law where intuitive balancing
may seem best,10° but we have more confidence in such balancing
108. U.S. Catholic Bishops' Pastoral Letter, The Challenge of Peace: God's
Promise and Our Response, in JUST WAR THEORY 103 (Jean Bethke Elshtain ed.,
1992); see PAUL RAMSEY, THE JUST WAR 430 (1983) ("[T]he good accomplished or
the evil prevented must be sufficient to justify (in a comparison of effects) the
evil that is unavoidably also done."); see also id. at 429 (comparing the
proportionality rule with the Establishment Clause test in Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971)).
109. See sources cited supra note 107; see also Aline H. Kalbian, Where Have
All the Proportionalists Gone?, 30 J. RELIGIOUS ETHICS 3, 3 (2002) (providing a
recent mixed perspective); Janet E. Smith, Moral Methodologies:
Proportionalism, 19 ETHICS & MEDS. 1 (1994), available at
http://acad.udallas.edu/phildept/smith/Articles%20mine/set%20of'o2Omine/Prop
ortionalism%20for%20Medmoral%20newsletter.html (providing a brief critique
of proportionalism). Whether we would want to continue to use the language of
excess or disproportion in a more rule-bound context would also be an open
question. Some writers continue to use the idea of proportionality in contexts
where more than calculative weighing and balancing is involved, but others do
not. Compare Richard A. McCormick, S.J., Ambiguity in Moral Choice, in
PROPORTIONALISM: FOR AND AGAINST 166, 209 (Christopher Kaczor ed., 2000)
(portraying proportionate reason inquiry as not reducible "to a simple
utilitarian calculus"), with Peter Knauer, S.J., The Hermeneutic Function of the
Principle of Double Effect, in PROPORTIONALISM: FOR AND AGAINST, supra, at 25,
29 (observing that a commensurate reason (ratio proportionate) says that the
entire act must correspond to its end (actus sit proportionatus fini), but end
means nothing other than reason for the act), and Bartholomew M. Kiely, S.J.,
The Impracticality of Proportionalism, in PROPORTIONALISM: FOR AND AGAINST,
supra, at 436, 448 (describing proportionalism as, supposedly, requiring an
unattainable common measure for all positive and negative results).
110. See, e.g., Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (three-part
due process balancing test); United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169,
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where we have a reservoir of many similar litigated and unlitigated
cases to draw upon.
One response to the difficulties of balancing, then, in the
context of war crimes trials, would be to think of excess or
disproportion as acting without sufficient legal justification, and
specifically as violating a relevant, knowable, established legal rule.
Violating the rule would itself constitute the legal unjustifiedness,
or as we might still say, the excessiveness or disproportionality of
the act. The particular substantive legal rules establishing legal
excess or disproportion could be negotiated. Perhaps something like
the use of the most discriminating arms technology culturally
available, in any permissible and potentially effective general arms
category, could be required. The legal focus could be on
discriminating arms in an attempt to set reasonably determinate
and potentially enforceable legal limits. Something like this
approach is often applied in the complex domestic legal area of
pollution control technology.'
The law of war could in this respect be adjusted to accommodate
both rich and poor groups. While dominant cultures would
presumably do most of the selling of discriminant arms, the law
could require buyer subsidies. Any group should be able to obtain a
binding declaratory judgment that as of a given time, a particular
weapons technology qualifies as the most potentially discriminant in
its category. Such judgments are bound to be complex and
controversial in some cases, and it is best that such legal judgments
be made before, rather than after, a war is over. As both arms
buyers and arms sellers would realize, unfortunately, more
discriminant weapons will also pose a greater danger not only to
military targets, but to innocent civilians, if deliberately aimed at
such persons. Of course, using discriminant weapons to
intentionally attack civilians would be an even more egregious
violation of the law of war.
Legal attempts to limit incidental civilian casualties may have
some value, though, even where such provisions are difficult to
enforce. We may assume at least hypothetically that not all
combatant groups are disposed to take international legal
limitations on incidental civilian casualties with equal seriousness.
173 (2d Cir. 1947) (tort negligence calculus). Compare the assumptions in
Michael Walzer, Five Questions About Terrorism, 49 DISSENT MAG. (2002), at
http://www.dissentmagazine.org/menutestlarchives/2002/wi02/walzer.shtml
(last visited Jan. 28, 2003).
111. See, e.g., Alaska Dep't Envtl. Conservation v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency,
244 F.3d 748, 749 (9th Cir. 2001) (discussing EPA air pollution requirement of
"Best Available Control Technology").
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Some combatant groups may be more concerned than others with
their general, cross-cultural reputation for compliance with the laws
of war. Some combatant groups may be disposed to see almost any
military advantage accruing to their forces as outweighing almost
any level of incidental civilian casualties. Some, indeed, use their
own or other civilians in conscious attempts to shield their own
military from attack."2 And some even count intentional killings of
foreign civilians and the intentional destruction of alien religious
and cultural objects". as a good thing. Such groups may not be
particularly troubled by doing incidentally what they have sought to
do deliberately, particularly if they perceive the international legal
system as stacked against them.
For combatant groups that can be classified as, at least over the
short term, relatively insensitive to some of the relevant
international legal norms, the practical difference between a
balancing and a non-balancing interpretation of the incidental
civilian-casualty law may be limited. Perhaps a flat, unequivocal,
clear rule intended to reduce incidental casualties might for such
groups have a slightly greater deterrent effect than a balancing test,
which might be seen as more of an invitation to post-war debate.
We can imagine that if a group believes that the laws of war are
unfair or will be applied unfairly, that group may fear and steer
cautiously around vague and easily manipulated balancing tests.
But it is not clear how many combatant groups are inclined to react
in this way. On the other hand, for combatant groups that at least
in the short term are especially sensitive to the relevant
international legal norms, a vague balancing test might more clearly
minimize incidental civilian casualties. A reputationally-sensitive
combatant knows that under a vague balancing rule, any level of
incidental civilian casualties may, in some quarters, be deemed too
much, regardless of which weaponry was used, or how carefully, and
therefore an at least arguable violation of the law. Under a
balancing test, therefore, a reputationally-sensitive combatant will
feel some additional public pressure to reduce incidental civilian
casualties to a minimum.1
4
112. See supra notes 7, 34-35 and accompanying text.
113. See, e.g., Edward Girardet, The Buddha Tragedy and Beyond,
CHRISTIAN SC. MONITOR, Mar. 14, 2001, at 11, 11 (discussing destruction of
Buddhist archeological sites by the Taliban regime in Afghanistan).
114. We are assuming here that relatively law-sensitive combatant groups
will seek to avoid violations of the law of war, and to some degree will seek to
avoid acting in ways that raise the possibility of even a colorable claim of
violation of the laws of war. Presumably such a relatively law-sensitive
combatant group will seek to minimize the gravity of any violations of the law of
war. For a general background, see Oren Gross, The Grave Breaches System
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Thus, it seems possible that some sort of fixed rule might
minimize incidental civilian casualties inflicted by some less
reputationally-sensitive combatants, whereas a balancing test might
minimize such casualties inflicted by more reputationally-sensitive
combatants. Overall, a balancing test might therefore seem best, on
the grounds that the less reputationally-sensitive combatants will
not likely be sensitive to differences in the form of the incidental
casualty rules, and that such combatants will also likely be liable for
more serious intentional violations of the law of war. But one could,
on the other hand, conclude overall in favor of a flat rule, on the
grounds that the most reputationally-sensitive combatants will, to
some degree, be moved by critical and world opinion even where
actual violations of the law of war are not in issue.
The ultimate choice in this context as between a rules versus a
balancing interpretation, assuming that the law requires some
single uniformly applicable formulation, should appropriately
balance considerations of compliance and realistic enforceability and
genuinely progressive substantive legal content. One consideration,
among others, is that while a flat rule focusing on the use of the
most potentially discriminating technology could have some
educative value, a balancing test, even if vaguely formulated, could
more directly and explicitly embody the real values at stake, and
thus be of even greater educative value over the long term.
Of course, the law of incidental civilian casualties could include
a combination of both balancing and fixed rule components, hoping
for the best of both worlds. The effects of such mixed rules would
vary depending upon whether the mixture jointly constituted an
especially stringent but credible rule, or instead allowed compliance
merely with any one component of the rule to suffice. Mixed rules
might be designed to affect rich and poor groups differently. More
complex forms of mixed rules would presumably have even more
unpredictable and judicially debatable effects.
VI. MORE THOUGHTS ON THE UNTHINKABLE: COULD INTENTIONAL
CIVILIAN CASUALTIES EVER BE JUSTIFIED?
A The Available Conceptual Tools
Let us suppose that we could somehow know that intentionally
inflicting some number of civilian casualties would likely result in
and the Armed Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 783, 785-
86 (1995) (discussing the grave breaches system and its relationship with
international humanitarian law). See also id. at 792-93 (discussing the need for
respect, uniform practice and compliance, and education regarding egregious
conduct).
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some immense military payoff, or even the permanent avoidance of
some moral catastrophe in favor of a much better permanent
outcome. Let us also assume that there is no substantially less
morally objectionable way of attaining anything like these moral
goals. As well, we can specify that none of the potential civilian
casualties is at fault in seeking strategically to manipulate the
conduct of the war, or is being manipulated strategically by any
antagonist.
How are we to think about the unthinkable?115 This task has
been undertaken in the context of actually intended civilian
casualties by Michael Walzer and by other observers of war and
morality.1 6  We can begin to reconstruct some of the thinking
involved by first noting the general distinction between what are
called deontological and consequentialist approaches to ethical
decision-making.
The boundaries between deontological and consequentialist
reasoning, and perhaps even the concepts themselves, are not
particularly clear.17 Roughly, the idea is that consequentialism
evaluates, let us say, acts, by reference to the consequences that
actually flow or that might flow from one or more persons' doing a
particular act."8 Acting wrongly, based on a consequentialist view,
involves something like "failing to maximize good consequences
and/or minimize bad consequences."' 19
In contrast, deontologists hold that the wrongness of an act
consists not, or at least not entirely, in the consequences of the act,
but in something like the moral quality of the act, intrinsically, or in
itself, perhaps as performed in some particular context. 20 Thus, for
115. This borrows the formulation of Herman Kahn. HERMAN KAHN,
THINKING ABOUT THE UNTHINKABLE (1962).
116. See infra notes 146-52, 173-76 and accompanying text.
117. See, e.g., Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, An Argument for
Consequentialism, 6 PHIL. PERSP. 399, 409 (1992) ("[I]t is still hard to classify
some moral reasons as consequential or deontological .... ).
118. See, e.g., LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE
5 n.8 (2002) (explaining the consequences of adoption as opposed to "what are
deemed to be relevant characteristics of the acts in question"); see Sinnott-
Armstrong, supra note 117, at 408-09. For a brief distinction in our general
context, see REGAN, supra note 86, at 92.
119. Heidi M. Hurd, The Deontology of Negligence, 76 B.U. L. REV. 249, 252
(1996) [hereinafter Hurd, Deontology]; see also Heidi M. Hurd, What in the
World is Wrong?, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 157, 161 (1994) [hereinafter
Hurd, What in the World].
120. See Heidi M. Hurd, Justifiably Punishing the Justified, 90 MICH. L.
REV. 2203, 2210-11 (1992) [hereinafter Hurd, Justifiably]. We shall here simply
assume that there is some sufficient distinction between the character of an act
and its consequences.
[Vol. 38
COMBATING CIVILIAN CASUALTIES
the deontologist, an act might in some sense maximize good
consequences, yet nonetheless be morally wrong because of its very
nature. 1
It may initially seem more natural for a deontologist to argue
that "if the norms of morality prohibit the action of killing an
innocent person, one may not kill an innocent person even if doing
so would prevent twenty innocent people from being killed."1' Many
of us certainly feel the moral pull of such a rule in the context of
wartime noncombatant immunity. We thus think of the rule
prohibiting intentional killing of civilians for a military advantage
as indeed a binding rule, not to be outweighed by the presumed
better overall consequences associated with the otherwise attainable
military advantage. Initially, the deontological approach may seem
the more natural way of expressing a binding moral commitment
against intentionally killing civilians.
Many of us, though, feel a pull of what may seem to be
consequentialist moral logic in some kinds of extreme cases.lH What
if following a rule in an extreme and perhaps unforeseen case would
lead to the avoidable loss of thousands or millions of innocent lives?
Most of us can offer no real account of when we should become so
dissatisfied with the disastrous outcomes of deontological
approaches that we should switch to consequentialism, and vice
versa. Most of us have no more explicit principle to govern this
switch between basic moral vocabularies than we do when we switch
our car headlights on or off in response to changing lighting
conditions.
Nor can we make much progress by focusing more specifically
121. See SAMUEL SCHEFFLER, THE REJECTION OF CONSEQUENTIALISM: A
PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATION OF THE CONSIDERATIONS UNDERLYING RIVAL
MORAL CONCEPTIONS 2 (1982) ("[Sltandard deontological views maintain that it
is sometimes wrong to do what will produce the best available outcome
overall."); Hurd, Justifiably, supra note 120, at 2209-11; Philip Pettit,
Consequentialism and Respect for Persons, 100 ETHICS 116, 117 (1989).
122. Hurd, What in the World, supra note 119, at 161-62; see also Hurd,
Justifiably, supra note 120, at 2211. See, in our context, JAMES TURNER
JOHNSON, CAN MODERN WAR BE JUST? 28 (1984) ("Warfare in which combatants
and noncombatants are perceived and treated as essentially alike is
fundamentally against the major moral tradition of war in Western culture.").
123. Cf Hurd, Deontology, supra note 119, at 253 ("No one is purely a
deontologist . . . .Deontological maxims thus function to trump otherwise
legitimate consequential calculations."). In our context, we may ask whether
considerations of morally relevant consequences could ever in some sense trump
a quite generally appealing morally based rule of civilian immunity. For one
heroic attempt to mix consequentialist and deontological elements in a common
formula, see Robert M. Veatch, Resolving Conflicts Among Principles: Ranking,
Balancing, and Specifying, 5 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 199, 211 (1995).
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on any particular version of consequentialism. Consequentialism
and its popular subcategory, utilitarianism, come in a variety of
forms, along several dimensions. There are, for example, act
consequentialism," rule consequentialism,"' and motive
consequentialism. 12 6 Rule consequentialism may vary according to
whether we think of only a single person, of many persons, or of
everyone universally following a proposed rule. 127  Assuming
universal adherence to a rule is, however, particularly unrealistic
and dangerous in the context of war, at high stakes, between deeply
opposed military forces.
Utilitarianism is in turn further divided into hedonistic'1 and
non-hedonistic,"29 and particularly preference-oriented, 3 0 forms.
And just as there are act and rule-consequentialisms, there are act
and rule-utilitarianisms,"' along with further subdivisions,
including actual rule utilitarianism, 132 ideal rule utilitarianism,
133
and possible rule utilitarianism.' 34 In some cases, these varieties of
consequentialism 5  and utilitarianism"6 may not be entirely
124. See, e.g., SCHEFFLER, supra note 121, at 2.
125. See, e.g., id.
126. See, e.g., id. Related to motive consequentialism would be a
particularly interesting variant, virtue consequentialism. See SHELLY KAGAN,
NORMATIVE ETHICS 214 (1998). For a narrower category, see Robert Merrihew
Adams, Motive Utilitarianism, 73 J. PHIL. 467, 467 (1976).
127. See Thomas L. Carson, A Note on Hooker's "Rule Consequentialism,"
100 MIND 117, 117 (1991); Brad Hooker, Rule-Consequentialism, 99 MIND 67, 67
(1990).
128. See SCHEFFLER, supra note 121, at 3 n.4.
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. See, e.g., Donald C. Emmons, Act vs. Rule-Utilitarianism, 82 MIND 226,
226 (1973) ("A particular falsehood might be optimific whereas the universal
practice would have a very different result."); Tushnet, supra note 56, at 1508-
19 (discussing the legal distinction between case-by-case balancing and
categorical or definitional balancing, involving balancing at a higher level, as
akin to the moral philosophical distinction between act utilitarianism and rule
utilitarianism).
132. See, e.g., R.B. Brandt, Some Merits of One Form of Rule Utilitarianism,
in JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM WITH CRITICAL ESSAYS 324, 327 (Samuel
Gorovitz ed., 1971) ("Rule utilitarianisms may be divided into two main groups,
according as the rightness of a particular act is made a function of ideal rules in
some sense, or of the actual and recognized rules of a society.").
133. See id.
134. See, e.g., J.J.C. Smart, An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics, in
J.J.C. SMART & BERNARD WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST 3, 9
(1973) ("There are two sub-varieties of rule-utilitarianism according to whether
one construes 'rule' here as 'actual rule' or 'possible rule."').
135. See Hooker, supra note 127, at 70 n.12 ("[Rlule-consequentialism
collapses into extensional equivalence with act-consequentialism if the rules are
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separable.'37 Crucially, though, in contemporary war, we should not
casually assume uniformity of norms across cultures. We should be
alert to cross-cultural differences in basic values, priorities,
experiences, motivations, perceptions, and beliefs.'8
In war, and perhaps especially in contemporary war, acting in
the way that would lead to the best result if everyone else acted in
that way may be especially risky where cultural differences in
perceptions and values are important and perhaps not even fully
understood. The other side may be unlikely to even roughly agree
with our own factual and evaluative characterization of how we
have acted. 139 And even if they do, they may still be deeply motivated
to act otherwise. 14'
When we consider the case of intentionally killing large
numbers of innocent civilians for some presumed great benefit, the
moral complications are further multiplied. We can certainly see
the costs of inflexible adherence to rigid rules in extreme
circumstances. It has been said that "to refuse to break a generally
beneficial rule in those cases in which it is not most beneficial to
obey it seems irrational and to be a case of rule-worship."' Should
we not be willing to pay some moral price to avoid the catastrophe of
allowed to be infinitely specific.").
136. DAVID LYONS, FORMS AND LIMITS OF UTILITARIANISM 133-34 (1965)
(arguing for the equivalence of act and rule utilitarianism).
137. For a looser sort of broader overlap, note that "a consequentialist can
consistently believe that rights trump (other) utilities." David Sosa,
Consequences of Consequentialism, 102 MIND 101, 103 (1993).
138. The cross-national and cross-cultural differences in war present
heightened, indeed multiplied, versions of some of the already significant
problems discussed by a distinguished Australian jurist and philosopher in D.H.
HODGSON, CONSEQUENCES OF UTILITARIANISM: A STUDY IN NORMATIVE ETHICS
AND LEGAL THEORY 50-62 (1967) (discussing the complications of attempting to
apply act utilitarian principles in the broader context of a non-act utilitarian
society). For an interesting, if statistically limited, view of some relevant cross-
cultural differences in perceptions, see Brian Whitaker, Muslim Countries
Doubt Arab Role in September 11, GUARDIAN, Feb. 28, 2002, at 17, 17, available
at 2002 WL 14616986. See also Barbara Amiel, Is the Muslim World Still in
Denial About September 11?, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Mar. 4, 2002, at 20,
available at 2002 WL 15724758; Richard Morin & Claudia Deane, Gallup, USA
Today, CNN Polls Come Under Fire: Watchdog Group Issues Rebuke on Poll on
Islamic Countries, WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 2002, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wpdyn?pagename=article&node=&contentI
d=A27302002Mar22&notFound=true (critically discussing in particular the
Gallup Poll of Islamic countries).
139. See the perceptual and valuational differences referred to supra note
138.
140. See id.
141. Smart, supra note 134, at 10.
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the heavens actually falling?
We should of course be alert to the possibility of exceptional
circumstances, and of proper exceptions to rules. But it has sensibly
been replied: "[there are of course cases in which following a 'rule of
thumb' will generate more disutility than breaking it. But
necessarily, of course, there is no certain way of identifying such
cases in advance." 42 At a very minimum, knowing when it is right
to intentionally kill large numbers of civilians, in the context of
contemporary war, will be especially difficult.
In the most general of contexts, Philip Fisher has observed that:
If causality and Consequentialism, unexpected as well as
easily anticipated consequences, remote as well as proximate
changes in how the world now stands after an event, include
consequences for second-, third- and tenth-order persons, and
if this is a normal truth about action, then "and so on and on"
is one of the most powerful phrases in our vocabulary.14
Can we even imagine someone like Alexander the Great, Julius
Caesar, or Socrates actually making an important decision based on
clearly understanding the particular long term good and bad
consequences of their act?
We sometimes manage well enough to decide when to violate
the general rule against, say, unconsented touching" in the case of
an otherwise unattended choking victim,1" despite all the
unanticipated effects that may radiate from such a rescue. But it is
just this sort of familiar decision that may tempt us into a less
justified exceptionalism in dramatically different contexts, including
modern warfare.
B. The Walzer Dilemma
For the theorist Michael Walzer, the possibility of wartime
exceptionalism arises in this way: "Given the view of Nazism that I
am assuming, the issue takes this form: should I wager this
determinate crime (the killing of innocent people) against that
immeasurable evil (a Nazi triumph)?"' 46 Walzer would of course not
142. Bernard Williams, A Critique of Utilitarianism, in UTILITARIANISM: FOR
AND AGAINST, supra note 134, at 77, 126.
143. Philip Fisher, Comment, in JUDITH JARvIS THOMSON, GOODNESS AND
ADVICE 85, 93 (Amy Gutmann ed., 2001).
144. See, e.g., Michigan v. Reeves, 580 N.W.2d 433, 435 n.4 (Mich. 1998).
145. See, e.g., Jim Travisano, Breathtaking Rescue Missions, CURRENT
HEALTH, Jan. 1998, at 20, 20.
146. MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 259 (1977); see also Michael
Walzer, World War II: Why Was This War Different?, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3, 19
(1971) [hereinafter Walzer, World War III.
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permit the killing of innocent civilians if some other course would
avoid the immeasurable evil of a Nazi triumph,147 or even if some
other course offered "even a reasonable chance"' 4 of avoiding that
outcome. He appreciates the unavailability of certainty in matters
of wartime prediction and of full understanding of current wartime
circumstances. 49 But one can, and presumably must, seek out the
best current understanding and advice possible.1 50 Walzer then
concludes that, if "my perception of evil [is] not hysterical or self-
serving, then surely I must wager. There is no option; the risk
otherwise is too great."5'
Under these rare and tragic circumstances, "I dare to say that
there will be no future or no foreseeable future for civilization and
its rules unless I accept the burdens of criminality."'52 We may refer
to this as the "threatened evil," the moral catastrophe, or the"supreme emergency" argument.
If we are inescapably faced, in practice or in theory, with this
dilemma, we must indeed at some point put an end to the comfort of
tentativeness and vacillation, and make the most responsible choice
we can. But we must first work through the conceptual issues, and
the circumstantial and evaluative elements of the problem, as
carefully as we can.
It is difficult to know how literally Walzer's language is
intended. For the dilemma to arise, must the threatened evil be
"immeasurable"'5 in a strict sense? Or must the threatened evil
seem merely great enough, comparatively, to somehow override or
outweigh the evil of intentionally killing civilians as a likely
147. See Walzer, World War II, supra note 146, at 19.
148. Id.
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. Id.
152. Id. We shall make no attempt here to determine whether preserving
civilization and its rules is, for Walzer, authorized if not required by a higher
order moral rule, or else to be pursued as an overridingly good or valuable state
of affairs. Probably, any attempt to insist on a sharp distinction between a
deontological and a consequentialist approach under Walzer's assumed
circumstances is somewhat artificial. But cf IMMANUEL KANT, LECTURES ON
ETHIcs 149 (Benjamin Nelson ed., Louis Infield trans., Harper & Row 1963)
(1930). Kant's vaguely comparable discussion of suicide reads:
But in taking his life he does not preserve his person; he disposes of
his person and not of its attendant circumstances; he robs himself of
his person. This is contrary to the highest duty we have towards
ourselves, for it annuls the condition of all other duties; it goes beyond
the limits of the use of free will, for this use is possible only through
the existence of the Subject.
Id.
153. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
20031
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
necessary and effective means of avoiding the threatened evil? We
must ask this question for a morally important reason. If the
threatened evil is really somehow immeasurably or incomparably
great, and not just a grave evil, then Walzer's position is actually too
restrained. Why, under such circumstances, should we choose an
alternative strategy, not involving intended civilian casualties, that
apparently offers a lesser if still "reasonable chance"'14 of averting
the threatened immeasurable or incomparable evil? In a loosely
Pascalian 5 sense, reducing the chances of a truly incomparable evil
by any meaningful amount seems worth any morally limited price.156
If a threatened outcome is really incomparably bad, does not a likely
less effective response seem an irresponsible choice?
Walzer may, of course, not mean that a Nazi triumph would
have been in this very strict sense an incomparable evil. But we
must then turn to the world of practical, realistic complications. Are
there any upper limits on the morally permissible number of
intended civilian deaths, as long as all such deaths are thought
reasonably necessary to avoid the threatened catastrophic evil?
Suppose that the Nazi regime could at some point have been
neutralized by a few civilian assassinations.'57 Let us set such a
scenario as the least disturbing Walzer-type case. But now let us
assume instead that avoiding the Nazi triumph will require the
154. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
155. See generally BLAISE PASCAL, PENSPES (A.J. Krailsheimer trans.,
Penguin Books 1995) (1670).
156. This is, of course, not to suggest that the moral or other logic of Pascal's
wager on the existence of God, given the apparent stakes, is uncontroversially
sound. See, e.g., Gregory Mougin & Elliott Sober, Betting Against Pascal's
Wager, 28 NOQS 382, 383-88 (1994) (rejecting most, but not all, traditional
objections and devising others); Larimore Reid Nicholl, Pascal's Wager: The Bet
is Off, 39 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 274, 274 (1978) (rejecting Pascal's
logic); Merle B. Turner, Deciding for God-The Bayesian Support of Pascal's
Wager, 29 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 84, 84 (1968). Pascal's wager
seems to focus more on the ethics and prudence of belief and faith, problems not
similarly presented by Walzer's dilemma.
157. For background, see Thomas C. Wingfield, Taking Aim at Regime
Elites: Assassination, Tyrannicide, and the Clancy Doctrine, 22 MD. J. INT'L L. &
TRADE 287, 312 (1998). See generally Louis R. Beres, The Permissibility of
State-Sponsored Assassination During Peace and War, 5 TEMP. INT'L & COMP.
L.J. 231 (1991) (addressing the question of whether assassination is an
appropriate form of self-defense); Michael N. Schmitt, State-Sponsored
Assassination in International and Domestic Law, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 609 (1992)
(questioning when assassination can be distinguished from lawful combat);
Jami Melissa Jackson, Comment, The Legality of Assassination of Independent
Terrorist Leaders: An Examination of National and International Implications,
24 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 669 (1999) (determining that the assassination
of terrorist leaders is permissible under current national law).
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intentional destruction of a number of large German or foreign
population centers. This would involve not merely the destruction of
cities, but their entire living populations. Would increasing,
perhaps enormously, the number of intended but assumedly
necessary civilian deaths at any point qualitatively change the
moral issue?'5
The complications can be multiplied almost indefinitely. How
might the difference between combatants and noncombatants
change in the context of intentional killings to avoid catastrophe?
Which would be morally worse: to intentionally kill some crucial
voluntary, knowing, noncombatant supporters of Hitler, or to
unintentionally but quite predictably kill far greater numbers of
ordinary noncombatants for some proportionate military advantage,
bearing in mind the likely illegality of the first course159 and the
likely legality of the second?' 60 Have we thought through the
combatant/noncombatant distinction in this context as thoroughly
as possible?
We must then think of all of the degrees of certainty that can
properly be required. Walzer's standard regarding the moral
character of the evil threatened, and perhaps even its likelihood of
occurring, requires what he refers to as a non-hysterical and non-
self-serving judgment. 6 Depending upon how this standard is
interpreted, though, it may be either too easily met or too difficult to
meet. Few responsible groups, and no irresponsible groups, will at
the time officially recognize their own hysteria or self-servingness.
Yet hysteria, officially recognized only after the fact, is not unknown
in recent democratic history. 162 If a moral catastrophe, perhaps even
158. For the most wide-ranging and widely-cited discussion of how changes
in the numbers of persons involved may or may not require qualitative shifts in
moral judgments, see DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS (reprinted ed.
1986). For a discussion thereof, see READING PARFIT (Jonathan Dancy ed.,
1997). For some paradoxes and complications arising at least from rigidly
quantitative, narrowly incrementalist, or consciously manipulative reasoning in
some Walzer-type cases, see Larry Alexander, Deontology at the Threshold, 37
SAN DIEGO L. REv. 893, 894-912 (2000) (citing, inter alia, MICHAEL MOORE,
PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 669, 719-24 (1997);
Anthony Ellis, Deontology, Incommensurability and the Arbitrary, 52 PHIL. &
PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 855, 859-63 (1992)).
159. See supra notes 39, 97-101 and accompanying text; see also Robert K.
Fullinwider, War and Innocence, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 90, 94 (1975) ("To
intentionally kill noncombatants is to kill beyond the scope of self-defense.").
160. See supra notes 37-39, 159 and accompanying text.
161. See supra text accompanying note 151.
162. See, e.g., Blasi, Pathological Perspective, supra note 95, at 451 & n.2.
For further background in the historical free speech precedents, see also
Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 50-56 (1961). More broadly, one
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the abolition of recognizable civilization, genuinely looms, will
hysteria be readily avoidable or, for that matter, terribly far from a
justified reaction? Disentangling self-serving from properly self-
interested and public spirited or altruistic motives is, as well,
difficult even under much less demanding circumstances. 1
We should think also of the crucial dimension of time. The
passage of time is inseparably linked to the very nature and gravity
of the threatened evil. Expanding military empires become
overextended as much in time as in geography."M What are the
logistics of Nazis effectively controlling the culture, thought
processes, and deeply held values of five continents simultaneously,
and sufficiently long enough for the lamp of liberal civilization to be
more or less permanently extinguished? There is an important
difference between being driven underground and being
extinguished. Can we say that the combined economic potential of
the Axis powers, by comparison not only with that of the Allies, but
with the sheer magnitude of the task, could have more or less
permanently extinguished civilized democratic values?' Was
Stalinism within the U.S.S.R. able to approach anywhere remotely
close to eradicating disfavored thinking? If we do no more than
think of the basic economic productivity numbers for the relevant
period, it seems clear that time could not have been on the side of a
Nazi military victory of any description."
It is, in a sense, perhaps not really crucial to Walzer's supreme
emergency argument that there was not even a single moment in
which ultimate defeat of the Nazis actually required intentional
civilian casualties. Walzer's main interest may be either historical
or theoretical. Walzer may want merely to hold open the door for
such a policy, in some future horrifying circumstance.
But the Nazi case is certainly still relevant to the hypothetical
might well ask "who is there who does not think his cause just?" ERASMUS, THE
EDUCATION OF A CHRISTIAN PRINCE 104 (Lisa Jardine ed. & trans., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1997) (1516).
163. For background on some of the inescapable complications, see THOMAS
NAGEL, THE POSSIBILITY OF ALTRUISM 79-142 (1970).
164. A reading of the (admittedly abridged version of the) classic EDWARD
GIBBON, THE HISTORY OF THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE (David
Womersley ed., abr. ed. 2000), suggests that the limits to Roman rule were set
as much by the need to control across time and changing circumstances as by
the need to control simultaneously large geographical territories.
165. See, e.g., THE OXFORD COMPANION TO WORLD WAR II 921-23 (I.C.B. Dear
ed., 2001) (D'Ann Campbell & Richard Jensen contributors); id. at 1005
("Though the mere possession of material resources is not a full explanation of
Allied victory, it goes a long way towards explaining Axis defeat.") (Richard
Overy, contributor).
166. See id. at 1004-05.
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supreme emergency case. If we can sensibly doubt that there was
ever a moment when intentional killing of civilians-as distinct even
from massive numbers of unintended but predicted civilian deaths-
was really necessary to the survival of modern liberal values, this
may hearten us in prohibiting intentional killings of civilians
without exception.
We should also bear in mind that for the foreseeable future, and
perhaps even despite the role of computer technology, the bearers of
the Enlightenment legacy will likely be both cuturally diversified,
"decentralized," and economically far more powerful than those who
reject such values. 167 It is difficult to imagine a plausible scenario in
which the economically dominant, variously diversified forces of
modern liberalism must, in battling those who reject such values,
adopt a policy of intentionally killing civilians. Less drastic-even if
only less drastically criminal-means of preventing the actual
extinction of broadly liberal values would seem to be available.
We can perhaps imagine a case in which our intentional killing
of noncombatants might seem necessary to avert a large number of
noncombatant casualties caused by terrorist acts against the
democracies. This is at least conceivable. But a future large scale
terrorist attack against the civilian residents of a major Western
city, as horrifying as it would obviously be, comes nowhere near
Walzer's supreme emergency or civilizational extinction standard.
16
It is thus not difficult to build a case against any actual need for
Walzer's supreme emergency principle. And we could do so without
at any point invoking a principle that deontologically1 69 bars as
167. This is, of course, one of the disconcerting asymmetries of much warfare
in the post Cold-War era. See sources cited infra note 171.
168. See Walzer, World War II, supra note 146, at 18-19.
169. See supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text. Ordinarily, a
deontologist could say that it is wrong to lie, even if one lie would prevent many
more lies from being told, or would prevent some nearly catastrophic moral
horror. Or a deontologist might condemn a murder, even if the murder would
prevent many other murders, or a nearly catastrophic moral horror. Of course,
a deontologist might choose not to condemn some or all lies or murders. And at
least a broad rule consequentialist might condemn them all.
But what could a deontologist say, in parallel fashion, in the case of the
assumed extinction of moral civilization itself? Walzer proposes to trade
intentional civilian casualties for the assumed avoidance of what he takes to be
utter catastrophe. How, precisely, could a deontologist reject Walzer's position
in parallel with the above responses in the cases of lying and murder?
Would a deontologist say, in parallel, that we should not intentionally
kill many civilians in order to save moral civilization, even if in doing so we
could prevent many more civilians from being intentionally killed? Or even if in
doing so, we could prevent some nearly catastrophic horror? Or even if we could
save moral civilization thereby on many separate occasions?
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intrinsically evil the act of intentionally killing civilians. But it is
important to see the supreme emergency principle as not only
incomplete, logically questionable, and unnecessary, but as
affirmatively dangerous as well.
Walzer himself says that "[mlost wars are described in ultimate
terms while they are being fought."'7 ° This may, in the context of
recent NATO and other allied coalition actions, now be something of
an exaggeration. But almost by definition, this claim is more likely
to be true of desperate or fanatical groups17' and states who see
themselves, rightly or not, as culturally jeopardized and as long
oppressed by the well-off democracies. The stakes will tend to seem
higher for fanatical groups or nations that rightly or wrongly see
themselves as oppressed than for others.'72 And it will tend to be
just such groups that will see their inflicting intentional civilian
casualties as necessary for their very cultural survival, or in their
direct diplomatic or negotiating interest. From desperation, we may
expect what we perceive to be extremism.
If a group is willing to intentionally inflict civilian casualties, or
to redefine ordinary civilians as combatants, the group admittedly
The point here is not that the deontologist's response is unconvincing,
but that it seems somehow oddly disproportioned and unresponsive to the
circumstances Walzer assumes. For a discussion of the deontologist's insistence
on conformance to proper norms, and not to something like overall
minimization of all violations of those norms, see Hurd, What In the World,
supra note 119, at 161-62.
It is thus difficult for a deontologist to show that Walzer is merely
minimizing the total number of violations of some basic rule, as distinct from
complying with the rule on some given occasion. Walzer's supreme emergency
policy and the assumed moral consequences, in a broad sense, of following that
policy in appropriate circumstances are generally difficult to characterize. And
it is difficult to see in particular why a deontologist who opposes Walzer's
supreme emergency principle should be eager to insist that the principle not be
adopted, if the principle does all and only what Walzer claims for it, including
the salvation of moral civilization itself.
170. Walzer, World War II, supra note 146, at 3; see also Richard B. Miller,
Book Review, 14 J.L. & RELIGION 1013, 1016-17 (2001) (reviewing WALZER,
supra note 146, and stating that "[a]llowing for 'utilitarianism in extremity'
may easily erode the principle of noncombatant immunity, given that defeat in
war is often viewed by its victims as 'unusual and horrifying"').
171. See, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, Assessing "Terrorism" into the New
Millennium, 12 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 1, 16 (1999/2000); cf. Benjamin R. Barber,
Beyond Jihad vs. McWorld: On Terrorism and the New Democratic Realism,
NATION, Jan. 21, 2002, at 11, 11 (discussing the range of motivations and
perceived stakes for those engaging in Jihad); Richard Falk, In Defense of 'Just
War' Thinking, NATION, Dec. 24, 2001, at 23, 23 (distinguishing in this context
between the Al Qaeda group and the nation-state of Iraq).
172. See Barber, supra note 171, at 17.
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may not be inclined to wait for international law to recognize a
supreme emergency exception.' Such a group may regard some or
all of the law of war as biased against the oppressed, or may view
such law as of limited concern, given the threat to its cultural
survival. At the margin, though, there may also be groups that
would be willing to intentionally attack civilians only with the
arguable sanction of a generalized Walzer-type 174  supreme
emergency exception. Everyone else, however, may be better off
with an exceptionless rule, rather than with an occasion for likely
inconclusive cross-cultural debate over the applicability of Walzer's
well-intended exception. And it seems unlikely that a non-liberal
society that felt its survival to be threatened would acquiesce in a
literal Walzer-type exception that privileged the survival of liberal
democracy only, but no other form of society.
It is possible to argue, again in a loosely Pascalian kind of
way,175 that a Walzer-type supreme emergency exception, whether
confined to liberal society or not, should be incorporated into the
law, if this would meaningfully reduce the chances of the extinction
of modern liberal values, even if it is actually far more likely that
such an exception will be somehow misused and result instead in
173. See JOHNSON, supra note 122, at 28.
174. Other distinguished writers have been understandably sympathetic to
Walzer's supreme emergency doctrine, or something like it. See John Rawls,
Fifty Years After Hiroshima, in JOHN RAWLS, COLLECTED PAPERS 565, 565-72
(Samuel Freeman ed., 1999). Rawls indicates that civilians "can never be
attacked directly except in times of extreme crisis." Id. at 567. Rawls closely
follows Walzer's moral and legal analysis of World War II. Id. at 568-69. Rawls
concludes that:
[Tihe crucial matter is that under no conditions could Germany be
allowed to win the war, and this for two basic reasons: first, the
nature and history of constitutional democracy and its place in
European culture; and second, the peculiar evil of Nazism and the
enormous and uncalculable moral and political evil it represented for
civilized society.
Id. Rawls's discussion appears to raise issues similar to those evoked by
Walzer. For a discussion of Rawls's views, see Darrell Cole, Death Before
Dishonor or Dishonor Before Death? Christian Just War, Terrorism, and
Supreme Emergency, 16 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POLY 81, 90-91 (2002).
A certain ambivalence in extreme cases is also reflected in the work of the
philosopher Thomas Nagel. Nagel observes descriptively that "[tihe policy of
attacking the civilian population... seems to be accepted still, at least if the
stakes are high enough. It gives evidence of a moral conviction that the
deliberate killing of noncombatants-women, children, old people-is
permissible if enough can be gained by it." Thomas Nagel, War and Massacre, 1
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 123, 127 (1972). For interpretation of Nagel's position, see
R.B. Brandt, Utilitarianism and the Rules of War, 1 PHIL & PUB. AFF. 145, 146-
48 (1972).
175. See supra notes 155-56 and accompanying text.
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some increased number of intentional civilian killings. The idea
would be that it is worth paying a substantial moral price in order to
meaningfully reduce the chances of the extinction of liberal values
through war. At this point, we must simply doubt the realism of
this argument's major premise. It is difficult to say which is more
extremely unlikely: that modern broadly liberal values will
genuinely face something like permanent extinction specifically
through war, or that in such a context, only the intentional killing of
civilians, and no other legal or illegal7 6 course, would likely save
those values.
In any event, this highly unlikely scenario seems hardly more
likely than one in which Walzer's own supreme emergency exception
itself indirectly encourages attacks on civilians sufficiently horrific
to damage or even jeopardize basic liberal values. We are perhaps
best advised to assume that these two extremely speculative
scenarios are of roughly offsetting likelihood, and to leave the
burden of proof with those who would permit the intentional killing
of civilians, along with the more likely misuse of an intentional
killing exception. 177
More broadly, though, can we make further progress on
assessing Walzer's supreme emergency doctrine by more careful
moral philosophizing? We again have at our disposal not only the
categories of consequentialism' 5 and deontology,"79 but the multiple
varieties thereof1 " Walzer's supreme emergency doctrine has been
characterized as "either a form of consequentialism, not unlike rule-
utilitarianism, or... a form of moral paradox."'' But the supreme
emergency doctrine really cannot claim the unique advantages or
disadvantages of either consequentialism or deontology, as it is
easily enough reformulated in terms of either approach. Something
quite parallel holds, as well, for the critiques of Walzer's doctrine.
Walzer is, in this regard, indeed often thought of as something
176. It might be, presumably, that the civilization could be saved by illegal,
but less gravely illegal, means.
177. For further discussion of Walzer's supreme emergency doctrine, see
BRIAN OREND, MICHAEL WALZER ON WAR AND JUSTICE 127-33 (2000) [hereinafter
OREND, MICHAEL WALZER ON WAR AND JUSTICE]; Stanley Hoffman, States and
the Morality of War, 9 POL. THEORY 149, 166-67 (1981); Brian Orend, Just and
Lawful Conduct in War: Reflections on Michael Walzer, 20 L. & PHIL. 1, 21-29
(2001).
178. See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 124-34 and accompanying text.
181. OREND, MICHAEL WALZER ON WAR AND JUSTICE, supra note 177, at 133.
For a vaguely similar characterization of Walzer's position, see JOHN FINNIS ET
AL., NUCLEAR DETERRENCE, MORALITY AND REALISM 201 (1987).
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of a rule consequentialist,1 82 in the sense that a decision-maker is not
to just uninhibitedly optimize the consequences in supreme
emergency circumstances, but to follow a relatively narrow rule 185
applicable in just those narrow emergency circumstances. Walzer
need not endorse the abandonment of all rules when the
consequences of following typical rules become catastrophic.1 84
Walzer can endorse following one narrow rule for supreme
emergencies when other, more familiar rules have exhausted their185proper scope.
Walzer might, in the alternative, defend his supreme emergency
principle by reference to the nature and character of the act,'8 under
exceptional circumstances, of attacking innocent civilians in order to
save civilization. The nature and character of the act could include
some reference to its context and purposes. Walzer's defense could
in this way be deontological. The idea would be that the nature and
character of the act would involve nothing less than upholding
modern ethics, or the modern ethical arena itself, at doubtless
unfortunate moral cost. 87 One could certainly say that preserving
scope for the very possibility of modern moral choice is itself a choice
or an intention, and not a mere consequence, as consequentialists
would use the term.
Of course, similar ambiguity between consequentialism and
deontology could characterize the approach taken by Walzer's
critics. We have already noticed above the possibility of
characterizing our critique of Walzer in consequentialist terms. 15
Walzer's supreme emergency doctrine, we argued, would quite likely
be of minimal positive consequence, and would likely lead to
generally bad consequences.'89 But it is certainly possible to shift
182. See OREND, MICHAEL WALZER ON WAR AND JUSTICE, supra note 177, at
132-33.
183. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
184. And thus we need not follow Walzer in his own characterization of his
position as a "utilitarianism of extremity." See OREND, MICHAEL WALZER ON
WAR AND JUSTICE, supra note 177, at 132, for discussion.
185. Walzer's supreme emergency rule seems sufficiently general, in
principle, to count as a rule, as opposed to a mere prescription of how to act
under only a single set of circumstances. These categories are capable of
merging at their extremes. See supra note 135. But for a characterization of
the supreme emergency rule as indeed a possible rule, see Brandt, supra note
174, at 147 n.3.
186. See supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
187. This is certainly not to deny a certain lack of clarity of the distinction
between consequentialist and deontological approaches, or the existence of some
overlap. See supra notes 146-52, 173-76 and accompanying text.
188. See supra text accompanying note 168.
189. See supra text accompanying notes 146-76.
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the terms of a critical approach to Walzer's argument. On such a
view, Walzer's principle conflicts with the deepest relevant and valid
moral rules, and the nature and character of the rule Walzer
recommends amounts to unjustified and unexcused intentional
killing of the innocent.'O This would be the beginning of the
deontological argument against Walzer's principle-one that would
ultimately be inseparable from, or a recharacterization of, the
consequentialist version of the argument against Walzer's principle.
We are left, despite these shifts in philosophical approach, with
the substance of the arguments already deployed for and against
Walzer's position. Walzer's position does not seem sound, but the
choice between consequentialism and deontology does not seem
relevant either way. We are left with the conclusion, whether one
accepts or rejects Walzer's position, that progress is more likely
through sound practical judgment191 on the part of thinkers and
legal actors than through more sophisticated manipulation of legal
and philosophical categories. An ounce of practical wisdom may be
worth a pound of conceptual or doctrinal machinations.
190. For the basic elements of such an approach, as deployed in the specific
context of John Rawls's parallel discussion, see generally Cole, supra note 174.
191. For an extended discussion of the important role of the Greek concept of
phronesis, or what we would call practical judgment, see ANTHONY T. KRONMAN,
THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 109-62 (1993). The
underappreciated virtue of practical judgment points further to the
underemphasized importance of instilling and promoting universally
appropriate political virtues. See also Robert C. Roberts, Virtues and Rules, 51
PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 325, 329 (1991) (explaining that virtues are
not just dispositions to action, "[t]hey are determinations of our emotions,
passions, desires, and concerns. They are patterns of saliency, attention,
perception, and judgment. Some of them are self-management skills (courage,
patience, self-control)."). Matters such as the judgment, courage, patience, and
self-control exercised by intentional actors seem subject to at least some
minimal collective steering. This steering may be undertaken by means such as
increasing the progressive content of the international law. And such steering
seems possible and important in the cases of unintended or perhaps
unnecessary or disproportionate civilian casualties, and of the intentional
killing of civilians.
For an interesting contrast between emphasis on virtue and on
pragmatic effectiveness, compare CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, 1 ON WAR 103 (Anatol
Rapoport ed., Penguin Books 1968) (1832) ("[Ihf we find civilized nations do
not... devastate towns and countries, this is because their intelligence.., has
taught them more effectual means of applying force than these rude acts of
mere instinct."), with the samurai tradition reflected in THOMAS CLEARY, CODE
OF THE SAMURAI 35 (1999) ("To abuse someone he sees cannot fight back is
something a valiant warrior simply does not do.").
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VII. CONCLUSION
We have seen that Walzer's supreme emergency principle
regarding intentional killing of civilians should not be adopted, and
that the methodological choice between consequentialism and
deontology in this kind of case does not seem to matter. Can we
make progress, though, on the earlier problem of how to treat
unintended civilian injury cases by reconsidering the distinction
between consequentialist and deontological approaches to such
cases? Again, a consequentialist approach will emphasize the good
and bad consequences flowing from the given act. 192  Equally
roughly, a deontological approach to incidental casualties will focus
on the nature and character of the act itself, more or less apart from
its consequences.9
One general possibility would be to try to short-circuit the
debate by ruling out deontology as itself a confused notion. Can we
really separate the nature and character of an act from all its
possible consequences? And even if we could do so, why should we
then much care about the act apart from all of its possible
consequences? Does not the nature of an act eventually somehow
translate, at least indirectly, into consequences? Suppose we say,
for example, that telling a lie has a moral quality independent of its
consequences.' T This may seem plausible, especially when we
realize that a lie might be instantly disbelieved and not acted upon.
A lie thus might seem objectionable even if no one relies on it.
But every lie, even an unsuccessful lie, tends to have at least
minimal polluting consequences once introduced into the stream of
discourse. Any lie may raise the possibility that listeners should
invest more effort in screening and filtering possible lies. Every lie
thus puts some minimal additional stress on our system of
communicative discourse. These effects seem to be morally relevant
consequences of even unsuccessful lies. Perhaps even the effects of
lying on the liar's own character could be viewed as morally relevant
consequences of lying. One's character presumably has
consequences. What we care about thus seems to come down,
directly or indirectly, to consequences.
In the case of foreseen but unintended killings, as distinct from
the case of lying, it is difficult to imagine that we can clearly
192. See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
194. It is certainly possible to interpret Kant's discussion of lying as non-
consequentialist. See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF
MORALS 89-90, 100-04 (H.J. Paton trans., Harper & Row 1964) (1785). For an
interesting consequentialist approach to Kant's moral theory, see generally
David Cummiskey, Kantian Consequentialism, 100 ETHICS 586 (1990).
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separate the nature of the act from the act's possible consequences.
It is even more difficult to believe that the consequences of the act-
including a number of innocent civilian deaths-are not of crucial
importance in morally judging the act. It is just barely possible for
someone to argue that the deaths of the innocent civilians are really
not consequences of the act, but instead are a part of the very nature
of the act itself. This would have the advantage for the deontologist
of bringing obviously morally relevant considerations-the foreseen
deaths-into the nature of the act itself. But it would only further
confuse what is to count as part of the act itself, and what is to count
as a consequence of the act.
Ultimately, though, we cannot hope to show that there is no
possible way of conceiving of the distinction between act and
consequence that makes sense, and that focuses at least some moral
attention on the act itself. There may thus be some way of
developing a consistent and plausible deontology. We need not, for
our purposes, claim otherwise. We certainly need not claim that
deontological approaches to unintended civilian casualties cannot
possibly work.
All this is complicated in the broader legal context by the fact
that there can be strict liability crimes, in which the actor's degree
of care may have been impeccable, but the actor is still held liable. 95
We might say in such a case, as a deontologist might, that the actor
is held strictly liable for the nature of the carefully undertaken but
injurious act itself. Or we might alternatively choose to say, with
the consequentialist, that the actor is being held strictly liable,
without regard to his precautions, for the harmful consequences of
his acts.
It is probably more natural in the cases of unintended civilian
casualties to say that the actor may be held liable for the
unintended casualties precisely as consequences of the act. There
seems no real harm in these cases in focusing on the consequences of
an act, apart from the nature of the act itself. Even here, though,
we should not overplay the role of consequences in the moral and
legal analysis. Some sort of intended overt military act is still
required, and it is possible that not all consequences of the overt act
are equally morally relevant. Consequences of a military decision
may radiate out over time and space, such that some consequences
may be deemed too remote, or simply not the proximate result of the
195. A strict liability crime has been defined as "[a] crime that does not
require a mens rea element .... " BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 378 (7th ed. 1999);
see, e.g., Wisconsin v. Coleman, 556 N.W.2d 701, 703-04 (Wis. 1996) (felon in
possession of a firearm).
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military action at issue. 19
The categories of the consequentialists and the deontologists
thus cannot be conclusively refined in such a way as to further
improve the law of war in the context of either intended or
unintended civilian casualties. But can we nevertheless do better
than the current law in other respects?
The law to which we publicly commit ourselves may differ from
our possibly secret reserved and unspoken intentions. Perhaps, in
Walzer's supreme emergency case,1 7 the best outcome actually
requires some duplicity. Perhaps the best policy, ideally, might be
to adhere publicly to an absolute prohibition on intentional killings
of civilians, and to expect and insist that others follow such a policy,
while silently reserving for modern broadly liberal states like the
United States'9 the possibility of inflicting such casualties if we ever
believe ourselves to be in Walzer's circumstances of supreme
emergency.
Some might see this "dual track," or baldly hypocritical,
approach as offering the "best of both worlds." Enemies and
presumed fanatics are to be held bound by the absolute prohibition,
lest they inflict massive civilian casualties in an attempt to preserve
largely repressive cultural values with which we may have, at best,
only quite modest sympathy. But we would at the same time have
no real intention of permitting the anticipated destruction of modern
civilized values. Both a morally objectivist and a morally relativist
culture can, quite consistently, rank the preservation of its own
values higher than the preservation of noncombatant lives. '99
But this "best of both worlds" defection from an absolute
prohibition of intentional killings would, unfortunately, likely tend
mainly to increase the risk of outcomes we would think of as
remarkably undesirable. The "dual track" approach would more
likely increase the risk of plainly bad outcomes than meaningfully
diminish the risk of the worst imaginable outcomes. The crucial
problem is that the possibility of publicly agreeing to the absolute
prohibition of intentional civilian killings, while privately reserving
the option of future non-compliance, is universally obvious. This
possibility of hypocrisy will thus be obvious to all of one's potential
antagonists. Any party can examine the military capabilities,
deployments, military culture, academic culture, popular culture,
196. See, e.g., Doe v. Boys Club of Greater Dallas, Inc., 907 S.W.2d 472, 477
(Tex. 1995) (discussing proximate cause in a negligence cause of action).
197. See supra Part VI.B.
198. The price of strategic defection in other contexts is explored in ROBERT
AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 68-69, 176-77 (1984).
199. See supra Part IV.
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journalism, history, and publicly expressed mood of any other party.
A formal commitment of a party to the absolute prohibition against
intentional killings of civilians may seem, in that context, either
more or less credible.
Even a "secret" policy is thus likely to have and to require some
sufficient supporting cultural manifestation, at least in a society as
open as our own. In our open society, distinguished commentators
would offer moral support for the tacit reservation in question. 00 At
some point, it could eventually become rational for other
international parties to conclude that our formal adherence to the
absolute prohibition cannot practically be counted upon, and is
merely strategic or manipulative, rather than sincere.2°'
This is not to suggest that a fanatical party that rightly or
wrongly sees its way of life as threatened, and salvageable only by
massive intentional killings of civilians, is likely to be crucially
influenced by our own assumed hypocrisy on the legal rule in
question. But it is also certainly possible that a presumed fanatical
group might feel less inhibited about committing a broad range of
possible international legal crimes if it senses that the broad liberal
commitment against intentional killing of civilians is unworthy of
trust.
In contrast, any consideration that suggests to presumed
fanatical groups that their target states really have not even tacitly
legitimized the massive killing of civilians should tend to reduce the
payoff from, and thus the probability of, attacks on civilians by
fanatical groups. Our consistent and credible repudiating of any
possibility of such an attack is thus still well advised. Such a
repudiation would, of course, preclude us from attempting to save
modern liberal civilization in exactly the manner Walzer
recommends. But as we have seen above, 2 foreswearing Walzer's
supreme emergency option is largely a matter of foreswearing
merely a series of compounded illusions.
200. See supra note 174 and Part VI.B.
201. For a brief discussion in another context of some indirect costs of
strategic defection, see Peter Huber, Competition, Conglomerates, and the
Evolution of Cooperation, 93 YALE L.J. 1147, 1154-55 (1984) (reviewing
AXELROD, supra note 198).
202. See supra Part VI.B.
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